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3Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the
primary objective of Hungary's central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low
inflation allows the economy to function more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over
time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring
an inflation near the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-
making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected devel-
opment of inflation every three months, in order to establish the monetary conditions that are consistent
with achieving the inflation target. The Council's decision is the result of careful consideration of a wide
range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook,
money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance
transparency, the Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy
decisions. The Report on Inflation presents the inflation forecasts prepared by the Economics
Department, as well as the macroeconomic developments underlying these forecast. The Report is
published biannualy, while twice a year partial updates of the forecasts are also prepared. The fore-
casts of the Economics Department are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in producing its fore-
casts, the Economics Department assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of
economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the
Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics Department staff under the general direction of Ágnes
CSERMELY, Head of Department. The project was managed by Barnabás FERENCZI, Deputy Head of the
Economics Department, together with Attila CSAJBÓK, Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division,
Balázs VONNÁK, Deputy Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, Mihály András KOVÁCS,
Deputy Head of the Conjunctural Assessment and Projections Division, and Zoltán M. JAKAB, Head of the Model
Development Unit. The Report was approved for publication by István HAMECZ, Managing Director.
Primary contributors to this Report also include, Judit ANTAL, Zoltán GYENES, Cecilia HORNOK, Zoltán JAKAB,
Gábor KÁTAY, Mihály András KOVÁCS, Zsolt LOVAS, Gábor ORBÁN, András OSZLAY, Dániel PALOTAI, Barnabás
VIRÁG, Balázs VONNÁK, Zoltán WOLF. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include var-
ious staff members of the Economics Department and the Monetary Instruments and Markets Department,
Statistics Department. Translated by Sándor FAZEKAS, Éva LI, Edit MISKOLCZY and Éva TAMÁSI. 
The Report incorporates valuable input from the MNB's other departments as well as the Monetary Council's com-
ments and suggestions following its meetings on 14 November and 28 November 2005. However, the projections
and policy considerations reflect the views of the Economics Department staff and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Monetary Council or the MNB.
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7Overview
According to our main scenario, which – consistent with earlier
practice – is conditional on the assumption of an unchanged short-
term interest rate and exchange rate, inflation remains low and
economic growth stable over the next two years. 
However, the persistently high general government and current
account deficit continues to call into question the sustainability of
the macroeconomic path. The future adjustment of unsustainable
trends may occur through several mechanisms. Regardless of
whether this adjustment is attributable to changes in the external
financial environment or to the behaviour of domestic economic
participants or  a correction in economic policy, it may lead to a
fundamental transformation of current monetary conditions and
other factors influencing inflation. The timing and impact on infla-
tion of such changes are hard to predict. Therefore, in evaluating
our inflation projection, it should be taken into consideration that
this forecast does not, in any manner, reflect the impact of any
possible future adjustments to unsustainable trends.
As regards other conditions, in the light of the 2006 draft budget,
we expect fiscal policy to continue to boost domestic demand. By
contrast, our assumption for 2007 is a path of neutral effect or
some moderate contraction in demand. As for developments in oil
prices in the global market, we expect them to remain persistently
high, in line with market expectations.
While core inflation has remained broadly flat at a low level recent-
ly, the gap between the overall CPI and core inflation has widened,
due to historically high oil and unprocessed food prices. This
growing gap has also been observed in developed economies In
addition to the globally low inflation of processed traded goods
competing in global markets, the strong exchange rate of the forint
and increasingly fierce import competition have contributed to
reducing core inflation. By contrast, there was no material reduc-
tion in the inflation gap between tradables and nontradables.
Against a backdrop of a general easing in labour market condi-
tions in 2005, ULC in the private sector have fallen to a level con-
sistent with lower inflation, i.e. no material cost-push inflationary
pressure has built up in the labour market. Inflation expectations,
which are at steadily low levels in historical terms, and consumer
Equilibrium risks render the sus-
tainability of a low inflation envi-
ronment uncertain
Fiscal policy continues to fuel
domestic demand in 2006; 
Oil prices remain high
Low core inflation, an increasing-
ly marked difference between the
CPI and core inflation, with wage
inflation becoming stable
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demand, which is expanding at much more slower pace than in
previous years, have also been instrumental in the consolidation of
the low inflation environment.
If all of our assumptions hold true, inflation may remain low,
although as soon as the temporary impact of VAT rate cuts wears
off, core inflation is likely to rise. As far as other goods are con-
cerned, the dynamics of inflation is expected to slow down. A rise
in core inflation over the longer term is attributable to the fact that
although nearly all macro-economic factors have been suggesting
disinflation, in the future the various impacts of these factors may
change. Within this, the turnaround in core inflation is ascribable
mainly to a steady rise in imported inflationary pressure, which has
recently been at a historically low level. This rise is due in part to
the recent increase in European imported inflation and in part to
the diminishing impact of competition in the domestic goods mar-
ket. Historically high oil prices and the feed-through of increases
in regulated prices into producer costs foreshadow a rise in infla-
tion. Furthermore, increasingly buoyant domestic demand also
suggests a future increase in the currently low level of inflation.
In our judgement, overall, the rate of wage growth – assuming
no substantial secondary effects of the minimum wage hike –
will be consistent with the inflation target over the forecast hori-
zon, and the economy is expected to grow around its long-term
trend. The majority of the direct impacts of government meas-
ures are expected have disinflationary implications. Never-
theless, the indirect impact may lead to stronger inflationary
pressure over the long term, by stimulating goods and labour
market demand; over the forecast horizon, however, the impact
of these indirect effects may only partly offset the direct disin-
flationary influences.
Consequently, we anticipate a temporary decline in annual CPI
inflation to approximately 1 per cent in 2006, owing primarily to
VAT rate cuts and certain postponed raises in regulated prices. In
2007, the CPI approximates to the 3 per cent inflation target. At the
same time, core inflation will decline below 1 per cent in 2006,
while picking up to the rate of overall inflation in 2007. In our main
scenario, the inflation differential with respect to the euro area is
expected to decrease over the forecast horizon.
Fluctuations in the CPI will mainly be due to VAT rate cuts in 2006;
apart from the direct impact of changes in the tax regime, inflation
Inflation is expected to stand at
approximately 3 per cent in 2007
Overview
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remains stable as reflected in a constant tax inflation close to 3 per
cent.
Of the quantifiable risks to the inflation, it is oil prices and trends in
imported inflation over the short term, and wages and demand
over the longer term that are of key importance. While imported
inflation, oil prices and demand pose an upside risk to inflation,
wages represent a risk to inflation below the central path. In 2007,
assuming an unchanged short-term interest rate and exchange
rate at the October level, quantifiable risks point to slightly lower-
than-target inflation rate.
Quantifiable risks point to  slight-
ly lower-than-target inflation rate
in 2007
Fan chart of the inflation projection
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Summary table of the main scenario
(Projections are conditional, with the main scenario reflecting the most probable scenario that applies
only if all of the assumptions presented in Section 3 materialise; unless otherwise specified, percent-
age changes on a year earlier.)
1
For technical reasons, the indicator that we project may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it fol-
lows a similar trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value denotes narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
In its
data disclosure in October, the CSO introduced a new methodology of data disclosure (known as the FISIM adjustment, see Box 2.2) for GDP, which
entails an annual 0.3 to 0.5 percentage point higher GDP growth during the period under review. As no complete data series or details for the GDP were
available at the time of our projection, it was prepared in accordance with the old methodology; for information purposes we present the GDP figures
revised up in accordance with the estimated impact of the new methodology. 
4
As a result of the uncertainty over the measurement of foreign trade statis-
tics, as from 2004 actual current account deficit and external borrowing requirement may be higher than suggested by official figures or our projections
based on such figures. 
5
The 13th-month salaries carried over from 2004 to January 2005 in the public sector cause a downward bias of the 2004 wage
growth indicator and an upward bias of that in 2005. 
6
Consistent with the CSO labour force survey.
* Assumption for a fiscal impulse implicitly consistent with the macro-economic path; no detailed fiscal projection can be prepared for lack of a Budget
Act for 2007. ** Original data; in 2004, the leap-year effect may have caused an upward distortion in GDP of some 0.2 percentage points, and a down-
ward one in the same amount in 2005. In order for trends in growth to be assessed, these effects must be applied to adjust the data shown. *** Our pro-
jection includes the impact of the Hungarian Army's Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and increases community consumption and
imports. **** An MNB estimate.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Actual /Estimate Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation
1
4.8 5.9 2.2 0.8 2.8
Consumer price index 4.7 6.8 3.6 1.1 2.8
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.8 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.0
Impact of fiscal demand
2
-0.4 -0.6 1.0 1.0 (-0.5)-0.0*
Household consumption
3
7.2 2.5 2.8 3.7 3.2
Gross fixed capital formation
3
2.5 7.9 8.1 5.4 2.9
Domestic absorption
3
5.7 2.2 0.9 6.1*** 3.1***
Exports 7.8 14.9 10.3 9.2 9.2
Imports
4
11.0 11.6 6.6 11.1*** 8.2***
GDP
3
based on earlier data series 2.9 4.2** 3.8** 4.2 3.9
under the new methodology 3.4 4.6** 4.2** 4.5 4.3
Current account deficit
4
As a percentage of GDP 8.8 8.8 8.1 9.1*** 8.5***
EUR billions 6.4 7.1 7.0 8.3*** 8.3***
External financing requirement
4
As a percentage of GDP 8.8 8.5 7.4 8.4*** 7.7***
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings
5
11.1 7.1 7.9 6.7 6.1
Whole-economy employment
6
1.2 -0.4 0.1 0.5 0.7
Private sector gross average earnings 9.0 9.3 6.9 7.3 6.5
Private sector employment
6
0.7 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.1
Private sector ULC 6.5 3.5 3.2 3.1 1.2
Household real income 3.9**** 4.1**** 4.0 5.0 2.7
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The increase in risk appetite in the global financial
markets seems to be losing momentum, and there
is strong reason to believe that investor sentiment,
which has been benign so far, will change. In their
respective communications, the Federal Reserve
and the ECB have emphasised that in their judge-
ment risks to future inflation were on the upside.
The source of such risks is the impact of persist-
ently high oil prices on consumer price indices
and, in the case of the euro area, the rapid build-
up of excess liquidity. In response, markets
expect the ECB to raise its key policy rate earlier
than previously anticipated. Likewise, asset prices
suggest that the Fed may tighten its stance soon
as opposed to lowering its target for the federal
funds rate, in response to natural disasters hitting
the USA. Simultaneously, yields on 10-year euro
and US dollar bonds have also risen.
Experience confirms that premia over EUR and
USD interest rates on government bonds issued
by emerging economies move in conjunction with
EUR and USD interest rates. One explanation for
this phenomenon is that, due to a rise in the gen-
eral level of interest rates, doubts concerning the
sustainability of government debt in emerging
economies may grow, resulting in similar growth in
the expected risk premia. Another approach is
that higher EUR and USD interest rates dampen
investors’ risk appetite, since yields on their risk-
free portfolio are high enough as they are, thus,
they are less attracted to risky instruments. As a
result, yields in emerging markets grow more sub-
stantially than EUR and USD yields. Although
changes in the global inflation environment are not
reflected in risk indicators yet, there is increasing
risk that emerging markets will appear less
appealing to investors in the future.
Along with other regional factors, trends in the
global financial markets are clearly detectable in
the exchange rates of local currencies and devel-
opments in yields on long-term government
bonds. After remaining relatively stable for several
months, the Slovak koruna has weakened by
approximately 2 per cent since early September.
A similar development has been seen with the
Czech koruna, which had been strengthening
before September. The appreciation of the Polish
zloty has stopped. The EUR/HUF exchange rate
weakened by close to 4 per cent from early
September to mid-November. As regards govern-
ment bond yields, yields on 10-year eurobonds
and Czech and Slovak long-term yields rose
simultaneously. By contrast, yields on Polish gov-
ernment bonds grew more markedly, albeit with
some time lag, and this can be attributed not to
global factors but rather to uncertainty surround-
ing domestic politics. Risk premia on Hungarian
government bonds rose sharply relative to both
US dollar and euro bonds. Yields on 10-year
Hungarian government bonds were 150 basis
point higher in early November than two months
before.
A comparison of recent regional developments
in exchange rates and yields reveals that the
3
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Chart 1-1
10-year euro and US dollar government bond yields
Source: Reuters.
EUR/HUF exchange rate has weakened, and
yields on Hungarian government bonds have
grown to a much greater extent than in the rest
of the Visegrád countries. This suggests that
uncertainty concerning fiscal policy and the
introduction of the euro in September has come
to play a dominant role in domestic financial
developments. The impact of country-specific
factors is especially striking in the premia on 5-
year euroforwards 5 years ahead, which grew
significantly in the first half of September. There
has been no change in the case of the Czech or
the Slovak koruna. Although spread on the
Polish zloty also widened at that time, it did so to
a much lesser extent than with the Hungarian
forint. This development confirms the occur-
rence of a domestic risk premium shock which
mostly reflects deterioration in the market per-
ception of the credibility of economic policy,
nominal convergence and commitment to the
introduction of the euro.
Differences in domestic financial trends are attrib-
utable to the fact that, in the judgement of the
market, convergence in Hungary has reversed,
and the envisaged introduction of the euro in
2010 has become more doubtful than ever. In
early September it was announced that, based on
the recommendation of Eurostat, the statistical
office of the European Union, the Government
would not include the revenues from State
Motorway Management Ltd. in the general gov-
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Chart 1-2
Yields on long-term government bonds in the Visegrád
countries
Source: ÁKK, Reuters, Datastream.
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Ja
n.
 0
5
F
eb
. 0
5
M
ar
. 0
5
A
pr
. 0
5
M
ay
 0
5
Ju
ne
 0
5
Ju
ly
 0
5
A
ug
. 0
5
S
ep
. 0
5
O
ct
. 0
5
N
ov
. 0
5
Per cent
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Per cent
HUF PLN CZKSKK
Chart 1-3
Foreign exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro in the Visegrád
countries
Source: Reuters.
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
Basis points
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
Basis points
PLN HUFCZK SKK
Ja
n.
 0
3
A
pr
. 0
3
Ju
ly
 0
3
O
ct
. 0
3
Ja
n.
 0
4
A
pr
. 0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
O
ct
. 0
4
Ja
n.
 0
5
A
pr
. 0
5
Ju
ly
 0
5
O
ct
. 0
5
Chart 1-4
5-year forward premium 5 years ahead over euro yields
in Visegrád currencies
Source: Reuters.
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ernment and that it would recognise the costs of
motorway construction due in 2005 as govern-
ment expenditure. Furthermore, a Eurostat com-
munication based on the autumn fiscal notifica-
tions revised the 2003 Hungarian budget deficit
up to 7.4 per cent and the 2004 one to 6.5 per
cent (under the ESA methodology). Following the
decision on the accounting of motorway rev-
enues, the Government revised up its ESA-based
general government deficit target from 4.9 per
cent to 7.4 per cent. It also became clear in
September that, based on the 2006 draft budget,
the fiscal deficit would be considerably higher in
2006 than had been set in the Convergence
Programme.
In response to these developments, market ana-
lysts have revised upwards their fiscal projections
for both 2005 and 2006. The fact that market ana-
lysts expect a higher 2006 general government
deficit even on a cash basis suggests that they
expect real fiscal easing to take place next year
rather than simply acknowledging the changes in
the accounting methodology and incorporating
that into their perception of fiscal trends in
Hungary. The perception of trends in external bal-
ances has not, however, changed materially.
In the context of a repeated reversal in fiscal con-
vergence, the issue of the postponement of the
introduction of the euro has been raised on a gov-
ernment level, which is reflected in market expec-
tations as well. The majority of the respondents in
the Reuters surveys had perceived 2010 as the
target date of the introduction of the euro in
Hungary as a realistic objective. However, the sur-
vey conducted in October reveals that they now
put it somewhere between 2012 and 2014. The
anticipated date of Hungary’s entry into ERM II has
also been put off by several years, in response to
the adverse developments in fiscal convergence.
Deterioration in risk perception is also discernible
in the derived 3-month forward yield curve.
Relative to early September, expected 3-month
yields have risen concerning the distant future. By
contrast, there has been a more pronounced rise
in euro yields at the shorter end of the yield curve.
These phenomena confirm the conclusion that the
underlying reason for rising forint yields is mostly
stronger longer-term uncertainty.
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Chart 1-5
Expectations for domestic balance indicators
(2005 Reuters Polls)
Source: Reuters.
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Chart 1-6
Derived 3-month forint forward rates
Source: MNB.
There have, however, been changes in short-term
expectations for monetary policy in Hungary.
Developments in yields on 3-month treasury bills
point to the fact that expectations for cuts in the
central bank key policy rate tapered off in
September. Short-term yields rose after the
October rate-setting meeting, pointing to the pric-
ing-in of an interest rate increase. Despite rising
yields, ex ante real interest rates remained in the
range of 3-4 per cent, tipical in earlier periods of
this year.
Looking back over the past one and a half years,
we can conclude that there have been fluctuations
of a magnitude similar to the current one in the
exchange rate of the forint and in short-term
yields; the exchange rate of the forint did not
weaken more dramatically than it did in the spring.
However, only in 2003 H2 was turbulence similar
to that caused by the rise in yields on long-dated
5–15-year government bonds in September and
October and by the extent of daily fluctuations
recently experienced. A marked difference is that
the fluctuations in the exchange rate of the forint in
2003 were much more pronounced than they were
during the period currently surveyed.
The fact that a deterioration in risk perception has
led to adjustments in long-term yields rather than
in the exchange rate of the forint indicates that
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Chart 1-7
3-month forint benchmark yields and the central bank
key policy rate
Source: Reuters, MNB.
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Real interest rates*
* Monthly averages of one-year government bond yields deflated by the
current 12-month inflation and Reuters’ one-year ex ante inflation consen-
sus (year-end values, derived from expectations for average inflation using
interpolation). Expectations for December 2005 and 2006 were calculated
using Reuters’ inflation consensus (as at end-2006 and 2007) and expected
one-year yields (at end-2005 and 2006).
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The CPI-based real exchange rate*
* Real effective exchange rate, 2000 average = 100 per cent. Higher values
denote real appreciation. Our estimates of expectations for end-2005 and
2006 are based on a Reuters consensus on inflation and the exchange rate.
We assumed that inflation in trading partner countries would not change,
relative to a year-on-year average, and that expectations for the appreci-
ation/depreciation of the effective exchange rate would be identical to those
for the appreciation of the forint vis-à-vis the euro.
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exchange rate expectations have remained rela-
tively stable. According to the Reuters survey in
October, weakening affected analysts’ exchange
rate expectations more profoundly for end-2005
than for end-2006. Moreover, as markets expect
the difference between domestic and foreign infla-
tion to disappear, expectations for the real effec-
tive exchange rate have remained unchanged.
Both global and domestic trends suggest that the
likelihood of news that may improve risk percep-
tion will diminish in the months to come. Owing to
increasingly strong inflationary pressures, the out-
look for global interest rates points to higher rates.
Based on the responses of the market to the 2006
draft budget, no tangible improvement can be
expected in the perception of the euro conver-
gence process over the shorter term. In addition to
the persistent vulnerability of the exchange rate of
the forint caused by external imbalances, these
are the factors that will determine the financial
market context for monetary policy in the months
ahead.

2. Inflation and its
determining factors

21
2. 1 Economic activity
Data published since our August Report continue
to confirm the picture of stable economic activity in
Hungary. There have been no clear signs of an
upturn in foreign economic activity since the last
quarter, while growth in external demand is still
positive. Dynamic domestic business activity has
been supported by an increase in consumption
and investment.
Slow growth in external demand and improvement
in business confidence
The indicators of foreign business activity do not
show an unambiguously improving economic per-
formance. The growth of demand by Hungary’s
trading partners of key interest from the point of
view of domestic exports, measured both in
imports and in GDP, declined somewhat in Q2.
1
At
the same time, however, business confidence
indicators in Germany and the euro area suggest
that the business climate has improved further in
the last few months.
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Chart 2-1
Size of Hungary’s export markets and GDP in its major
foreign trade partner countries*
* Export markets size: weighted average growth of imports in Hungary’s
export markets.
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Chart 2-2
Business confidence index in the euro area (EABCI) and
in Germany (IFO)
1
For more information on economic activity in Germany, Hungary’s most important foreign trade partner, see Box 2.1.
Since Germany is Hungary’s largest foreign trade partner, its
economic developments have a major impact on the economic
activity of Hungarian enterprises. As the present state of the
German economy differs from that of the euro area as a whole
in many respects, it is essential to deal with German business
activity separately when attempting to accurately assess the
outlook for Hungarian economic activity.
Following the global recession in 2001, the euro area – albeit
gradually – recovered and the growth rate of GDP increased to
near the estimated potential rate of 1.8 per cent in 2004. By con-
trast, German GDP growth practically came to a halt in 2002,
and then showed a moderate decline in 2003. In 2004, it also
increased at a rate lower than the euro area average (1.1 per
cent). Due to Germany’s large weight in Hungary’s foreign trade
Box 2-1 Question marks regarding German economic activity
Slower output growth in manufacturing
At nearly 15 per cent in annualised terms, value
added in manufacturing was rather robust in Q2,
while value added in market services continued to
expand at a slower pace than the surprisingly fast
rate of increase registered in Q1. The growth rate
of value added in construction increased, most
likely caused by much more intensive-than-
expected motorway construction also appearing
in gross fixed capital formation on the expenditure
side.
In Q3, the growth of gross industrial output slowed
down modestly. Detailed data showed that this
deceleration was due to slower expansion in
manufacturing and in machinery and equipment in
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structure, this could have led to weak external impulses and lim-
ited sales opportunities abroad for Hungarian enterprises.
But this was not the case: after the global economic decline in
2001 the business activity of Hungarian enterprises recovered
in the following year, although activity did not return to the
same rate as experienced at the beginning of the recession. Both
industrial output and exports started to increase. The reason
for this was that while the slow growth of German GDP was
mainly due to subdued domestic demand, the business activity
of German enterprises on foreign markets recovered quickly.
Although the growth of German exports came to a halt in 2001
and imports fell significantly, German exports have continued
to increase from 2002 almost at the rate characteristic of the
period preceding the recession. Imports also started to
expand, mainly due to stronger exports, although the rate of
growth was far short that of exports due to the protracted
slump in domestic demand (stagnating household consump-
tion, significantly declining investments).
A large number of German economic analysts agree that
domestic demand is in a ‘vicious cycle’. A much better domes-
tic sales outlook would be necessary to boost investments, but
due to the moderate wage increases following the large wage
rises at the beginning of the 1990s and the shortage of employ-
ment opportunities, the income expectations of the population
are subdued and thus households are not increasing their con-
sumption at a level needed for enterprises to start new invest-
ments or to create new positions.
As regards economic outlook, both household consumption
and investments continued to decline in 2005 H1. Economic
growth was primarily attributable to the continued expansion
of net exports. In order to put an end to this ’vicious circle’
the government has started to introduce reforms in the labour
market and elaborate incentives for small and medium-sized
enterprises which will show their effect only in the long term.
Consequently, we can assume that the recovery of the German
economy remains primarily dependent on the improvement of
net exports in the near future, marked by outstanding growth
in exports and an expansion in imports at a slower rate than
that of exports, while still remaining at a high level. From the
point of view of foreign demand for Hungarian products this
is a favourable development as we found that this demand was
determined by the imports of Hungary’s foreign trading part-
ners to a greater extent than by their domestic demand.
Chart 2-3 
Germany’s key economic activity indicators
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particular.
2
Gross output figures indicate that
growth in industrial value added may drop in Q3,
while the outstanding rate of growth in Q2
strengthens risks pointing to a faster economic
growth in terms of the whole year.
Foreign trade in goods – robust exports, 
accelerating imports
Foreign merchandise trade statistics provide a
slightly different picture of industrial activity. Ac-
cording to foreign trade data, goods exports con-
tinued to increase robustly in Q3, while the slow-
down indicated by gross output was not reflected
in foreign trade statistics.
In our previous Report we discussed the recent
inconsistencies between foreign trade and GDP
statistics and how this calls into question the valid-
ity of merchandise statistics. Last year, import fig-
ures calculated on the basis of merchandise trade
statistics fell behind the figures expected on the
basis of estimated imports required by consump-
tion, investments and exports.
3
In Q3, uncertainty
decreased as imports began to grow: the differ-
ence between the deficit justified by merchandise
trade and other macroeconomic statistics stopped
increasing.
Developments regarding the terms of trade in
goods remain unfavourable. In our August Report
we noted that, as a whole, 2004 was characterised
by a deterioration in the terms of trade. This was
also reflected by the fact that the growth rate of
gross domestic real income (GDI) fell short of that
of GDP. In our view, the deterioration in the terms
of trade was not primarily due to the changes in
energy prices over the long term. The examination
of several quarters reveals that changes in the
terms of trade in goods, on the whole, were predo-
minantly influenced by changes in machinery and
equipment. Energy prices only had a significant
effect on the terms of trade in 2005 Q2. Further
analysis is required to assess the reasons for
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Chart 2-4
Industrial output – sectoral contributions to growth*
*Based on trend month-on-month indices.
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Chart 2-5
Exports and imports of goods*
* For 2004 we have made adjustments to the imports trend data series for
import purchases brought forward and for the public warehouse effect.
The former adjustment meant deducting an amount of EUR 350 million
from growth in imports in March and April 2004, which was added to
growth during the rest of the year distributed evenly from May. Adjustment
in the latter case meant deducting a total amount of EUR 419 million from
the value of (the c.i.f. value) of imports during the period between May and
July 2004. The value of the public warehouse adjustment was removed
from the data series for goods. Data for June are preliminary.
2
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment and transport vehicles: these are the two sub-sectors which represent the largest weight in
machinery and equipment.
3
For more details on this phenomenon, please see Box 4-5 of our August Report on Page 65.
unfavourable changes. It is, however, clear that
deterioration is not a typical phenomenon in the
Central and Eastern European region: it only took
place in Slovakia and Hungary between 2001 and
2005 on a significant scale.
Increase in household consumption – growth in
income and loans
In the whole of 2004 consumption grew at a stable
rate of approximately 3 per cent, with this rate
increasing in 2005 Q1 and Q2. The picture of
accelerating growth is supported by the continu-
ous increase in retail trade turnover since mid-
2004. Consumption has been determined by two
factors in the last few quarters. On the one hand,
disposable income grew rapidly, while on the
other foreign currency loans taken out by house-
holds for consumption purposes reached a new
peak. In light of rapidly increasing household liq-
uidity and other indicators, it is very likely that con-
sumption will pick up further in the coming period.
Robust government, moderate corporate investment
activity
Gross fixed capital formation declined slightly in
Q2, yet the first half of the year on the whole
proved to be rather intensive. In our previous
Report we expected a revision of the outstanding
growth in Q1 and an end to the recent significant
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Terms of trade in goods
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Chart 2-7
Terms of trade in goods in Central and Eastern Europe*
*2001-July 2005, year-on-year indices.
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Households’ consumption expenditure and retail trade
turnover 
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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fluctuations in the time series, but neither of
these expectations came true. Based on a more
detailed breakdown of investment statistics by
sectors, it is very likely that the higher-than-
expected growth in gross fixed capital formation
in H1 was due to the expansion of government-
financed investment (mainly motorway construc-
tion), which far exceeded our previous assump-
tions.
In contrast to government-financed investment,
households and the manufacturing industry are
characterised by much less intensive investment
activity. More in line with overall economic activity,
investment in the manufacturing industry grew at a
more modest rate in Q2, while investment by
households continued to decline. The two key
indices of the real estate market (the number of
building permits issued and home completions)
demonstrate weaker willingness to buy new
homes: the number of building permits has been
declining for more than a year followed accord-
ingly by a drop in the number of completions a few
quarters later.
Faster economic growth
In 2005 Q2, gross domestic product grew by near-
ly 4 per cent relative to 2004 Q2.
4
On the expendi-
ture side, growing economic activity is mainly due
to the combined effect of robust domestic demand
components and still favourable net exports.
5
Among expenditure items, the growth rate of con-
sumption increased somewhat in Q2 and the sur-
prisingly buoyant investment activity in Q1 did not
lose momentum to any great degree up to the
middle of the year.
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Building permits issued and homes built  
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
4
According to its publication of 3 October 2005, the CSO calculates gross domestic product (GDP) based on a new methodology (for more on this
revision, please see the Box text). Nonetheless, currently accessible data are based on the old methodology. 
5
The assessment of net exports, however, should be treated with caution due to the repeatedly mentioned uncertainty surrounding merchandise
trade figures.
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In its publication on 3 October 2005, the CSO
retrospectively revised the data on gross
domestic product (GDP). In this case, the
changes include the results of two impacts: on
the one hand, they were part of the usual statis-
tical data revision (i.e. the revision of annual data
on the basis of new information which became
available regarding earlier years – e.g. tax
returns, annual profit and loss accounts, bal-
ance sheets of enterprises, etc.), on the other
hand they represent a change in methodology.
Previously, fees for financial intermediation serv-
ices indirectly measured (FISIM) did not
increase GDP on the whole, while according to
this new type of calculation they appear both on
the production and on the expenditure side.
6
As this change in methodology may significant-
ly influence our picture of the rate and structure
of economic growth both in the period under
review (2002-2004) and most likely in the near
future as well, we will address only with this type
of revision in the following.
The new type of FISIM settlement must be intro-
duced by every EU Member State, to a great
extent during this year. According to the calcu-
lations of the EU and some of its Member
States (e.g. Germany and England), account-
ing for FISIM according to this new type of
methodology may increase nominal GDP by
approximately 1-1.5 per cent, but they do not
expect this to have a significant impact on
growth rates. These expectations are con-
firmed by international experience to a large
extent, but there are countries (e.g. Slovenia)
where this new method of calculation has led to
a modification of the GDP growth rate as well.
Box 2-2 FISIM-revision: new methodology – significantly revised GDP data
6
FISIM measures the issues of those services of financial enterprises which do not have explicit fees and thus they are included in interest.
According to the methodology applied so far this amount of services has not been divided, but it has reduced the economy's gross value added
as intermediate consumption of the national economy in its entirety. On the basis of the new methodology defined by Eurostat and to be intro-
duced in every EU Member State, FISIM must be divided among the sectors using it. Accordingly, FISIM – which has only appeared so far as a
current producer use – can be shown as current producer use, final use (mainly in the case of households) or exports from now on.
Table 2-1
Changes in GDP at current prices as a result of revisions undertaken
(HUF billion)
2002 2003 2004
GDP at current prices
(according to the last quaterly GDP publication of CSO) 16,740.4 18,408.8 20,338.2
GDP at current prices 
(using the old type FISIM settlement) 16,757.9 18,447.0 20,265.9
GDP at current prices
(using the new type FISIM settlement) 16,915.3 18,650.8 20,413.5
Impact of usual statistical data revision on GDP 17.6 38.2 -72.2
Impact of changing in (FISIM) methodology on GDP 157.3 203.9 147.6
Inflation and its determining factors
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This change in methodology increased the
level of Hungarian nominal GDP by around 0.7-
1.1 percentage points in the period published
so far (2002-2004), while revised GDP levels
have not significantly affected GDP-proportion-
ate indicators of economic equilibrium and
indebtedness processes. At the same time,
however, the growth path of the economy has
changed considerably: the new volume index
was 3.4 per cent instead of 2.9 per cent in 2003
and 4.6 per cent instead of 4.2 per cent in
2004.
The level increasing effect (i.e. the nominal
effect of the methodological changes regard-
ing FISIM raising the GDP level) is dependent
on households' deposits and loans and the dif-
ferential
7
achieved on the interests of these
transactions. While the amount of deposits and
loans is expected to rise significantly in the
future, simultaneously with this the interest dif-
ferential of transactions is likely to fall, partly
due to stronger market competition and partly
to the continuation of interest convergence.
The effect on nominal GDP growth is the result
of these two mainly contradicting changes. In
the case of the real growth rate of the economy,
however, we can expect a clearly positive
effect on growth
8
due to the gradual trend-like
deepening of the financial intermediation sys-
tem primarily vis-à-vis households. This means
that when and as long as the GDP-proportion-
ate amount of households' bank loans and
deposits exhibits trend-like growth (i.e. the
growth rate of nominal outstanding amounts
exceeds that of the nominal GDP) an impact on
real growth can also be expected.
9
Table 2-2
Volume indices of the main expenditure items of GDP
(annualised percentage changes)
2003 2004
Previous data Actual data Previous data Actual data
Household final consumption expenditure 7.8 8.5 3.1 3.2
Actual final consumption of government 6.5 11.2 -3.9 0.9
Social transfers in kind 4.9 4.8 -0.2 2.6
Total actual consumption 7.1 7.8 1.7 2.8
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.5 7.9 8.4
Gross capital formation 1.3 1.0 3.7 2.8
Total domestic use 5.7 6.2 2.2 2.8
Exports 7.8 7.8 14.9 16.4
Imports 11.0 11.1 11.6 13.2
GDP 2.9 3.4 4.2 4.6
7
In the case of loans: interest rate differential = average loan interest – reference interest, while in the case of deposits: interest rate differential =
reference interest – average deposit interest.
8
This effect might be in the range of 0.3-0.5 per cent in terms of yearly changes.
9
The value of FISIM calculated at the base price can be calculated using the following formula both in the case of loans and deposits: FISIM (at
base price)=(FISIM at current price/price index)*(interest rate differential in base period)/(interest rate differential in the reporting period). If we take
into account that FISIM at current price is the product of the nominal holding and the interest rate differential calculated in the reporting period,
we can see that FISIM calculated at the base price can be arrived at using this formula: (nominal holding/price index)*(interest rate differential in
the base period). The annual growth rate of this value is only dependent on the growth rate of the real holding.
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Growth data from the various countries paint a
rather mixed picture of economic activity in
Central and Eastern Europe.
10
Looking over the
last few quarters there are no signs of a significant
acceleration in economic growth in any of the
countries in the region: the gross domestic prod-
uct time series of some countries show a growth
rate of around 4-5% on an annual level in most
cases. Poland is the only exception where the rate
of economic growth fell very sharply to around 1
per cent according to 2005 Q2 figures. In our
August Report we wrote that, according to data
available to us at the time, the growth rate in
Hungary was one of the lowest in the region, but
these new figures on Polish economy have some-
what modified this picture. According to the latest
data, in Q2 the difference between the fastest
growing Slovakia, the Czech Republic and
Hungary
11
decreased and Poland took last place.
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GDP growth in the region* 
(annual growth rate)
* Growth rates were calculated using data not corrected for FISIM. The Q3
Hungarian growth rate is MNB-estimate based on the flash estimate by
Ecostat.
10
Until the FISIM correction is completed in national GDP statistics, cross-country comparisons can be carried out using uncorrected data.
11
For Hungary in Q3 Ecostat’s flash estimate with FISIM-correction was 4.6%. Without the  FISIM-correction, the estimated growth rate is 4.2%.
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2. 2 Labour market
Labour use still moderate despite buoyant economic
activity
The robust growth in external economic activity
since early 2003 prompted Hungarian enterprises
to increase their output significantly. Simultane-
ously with this – in addition to expanding invest-
ment willingness – labour demand has also incre-
ased, albeit falling far short of the growth charac-
teristic of that seen in the rising business cycles of
previous years. In the last one and a half years,
total hours worked (the key indicator of labour use)
increased only gradually and to a limited extent,
despite the intensive growth in value added.
These developments can be explained by various
sectoral effects.
Labour use in manufacturing has been continu-
ously declining in practical terms for the last five
years, despite the recovery in industrial activity
witnessed since the end of 2003, as evidenced
both by statistics in employment and in total hours
worked. Despite the decline in employment, aver-
age hours worked have increased considerably,
indicating that enterprises tend to make a better
use of their existing capacity as opposed to hiring
new employees. The weekly average number of
hours worked by manual workers is nearing its his-
torical peak very fast. Despite the continuously ris-
ing labour supply, the statistics – showing moder-
ate employment expansion and outstanding aver-
age hours worked – may indicate the continued
existence of a structural labour shortage or cau-
tious behaviour by enterprises. If most enterprises
are uncertain about their outlook for growth and
deem the positive economic activity to be merely
temporary, they increase the average hours
worked by their existing employees instead of a
more costly adjustment of workforce.
Long-term changes in enterprises’ production
structure is another reason for this moderate de-
mand for employment. In recent years, labour has
become considerably more expensive. Most
enterprises reacted to the sudden increase in la-
bour costs by gradually substituting labour for
capital. This substitution has speeded up in the
upward phase of the business cycle, which in itself
led to a growing demand for capital and lower
employment.
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Manufacturing output and weekly average hours worked
by manual full-time workers
Higher labour costs may be related to the gradual
decline of the Hungarian textile industry, which
continued in 2005 and had a major effect on the
growth in manufacturing employment. The output
figures of the last few months, however, suggest
a possible turning point: the long-lasting decline
in textile industry output seems to be coming to
an end. Nevertheless, at the time being the cur-
rently available information is not sufficient to
assess how permanent this output growth will be
and what effect it will have on the employment in
the sector.
The output of the services sector has gained new
momentum since early 2004. In contrast to the
previous period, growth was attributable to most-
ly external economic activity in the last year and a
half as opposed to consumption. Accordingly, the
increase in the labour use of the sector is mainly
due to the expansion of employment in trade,
transportation and storage services (i.e. sectors
associated with external demand and manufac-
turing).
With regard to the whole of the national economy,
the statistics of the National Employment Office
on mass layoffs and unfilled vacancies also indi-
cate weak labour demand. The number of
unfilled vacancies fell again following a rise in
2004. At the same time, however, the number of
mass layoffs also declined, albeit to a smaller
extent.
Growing activity, rising unemployment
As a result of weak labour demand in the private
sector and the gradual decline in the number of
government employees since early 2003, the num-
ber of employed has remained practically flat
since early 2004 on the whole economy level.
Economic activity, however, has started to
increase again recently following a lull at the end
of 2003 and in early 2004. Labour supply was
faced with stagnating labour demand, which
resulted in rising unemployment starting from early
2004.
The rising trend in employment willingness
despite weak labour demand is difficult to
explain. Initial findings of ongoing research show
that a part of the inactive population is almost as
closely attached to the labour market as people
with official unemployed status and this group
may even be considered as part of the labour
reserves of the whole economy. The co-move-
ment of the economic activity cycle with the
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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employment cycle, however, does not explain
current developments.
Declining wage inflation
Wage inflation in the private sector continued to
decline in 2005. In line with the gradual drop in
inflation expectations, nominal wage adjustment
has been observed since early 2004.
At first it was difficult for the private sector to adjust
to the disinflation trend which started early 2001.
The sudden and significant drop in the inflation
rate surprised private enterprises. Consequently,
both inflation perceptions and expectations have
long exceeded actual price rises which could lead
to higher nominal wage agreements. Even with
lower inflation expectations, enterprises could not
significantly decrease wages. Labour supply
stuck at a low level, the shortage of trained skilled
workers, the large rises in minimum wages in 2001
and 2002 and the significant wage increases in
the government sector coupled with an increase in
employment – further reducing the potential labour
force of the private sector – represented a series
of shocks to private enterprises. Consequently,
real labour costs have exceeded labour produc-
tivity for a long time which has led to an increase
in the wage share.
The pressure toward high wage growth has grad-
ually decreased since early 2004. Stronger indus-
trial activity, growing labour supply and weak
labour demand have finally given way to wage
adjustments. As a result of the rationalisation of
production and the increase in capital deepening,
productivity in the private sector rose significantly
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Private sector wage inflation*
(seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
* Due to adjustment for bonus payments, the time series is determined by
the dynamics of regular payments. In 2004 and 2005, the adjustment for
bonuses was undertaken according to our own estimate on bonus pay-
ments.
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Nominal unit labour cost, productivity and wages in the
private sector
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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Real wage costs, productivity and wage share in the 
private sector
(annual growth rates and levels)
during 2004, at a rate exceeding that of the
increase in real labour costs. In 2005, the gap
between the growth rates of labour costs and pro-
ductivity seemed to close gradually which sug-
gests more balanced labour market developments
in the current period.
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2. 3 Inflation developments
In 2005 Q3, the consumer price index (CPI) stood
at 3.7 per cent,
12
slightly lower than the Q2 index.
Core inflation, however, declined significantly,
falling by approximately 0.7 percentage points, to
1.5 per cent, compared to Q2. Accordingly, the
gap between the consumer price index and core
inflation continued to widen in Q3, i.e. inflationary
pressure is still mainly attributable to items falling
outside the scope of core inflation.
The growing gap between the two inflation meas-
ures is not only a Hungarian phenomenon, but is
observable in the euro area as well. While the
world market price of oil, which mainly affects
price developments in items falling outside the
scope of core inflation, rose markedly, the rate of
core inflation in the developed world slowed down
significantly. According to international analyses,
there may be several factors underlying this latter
process, including the strengthening of product
market competition seen on a global scale, credi-
ble anti-inflationary monetary policies in devel-
oped countries and the subdued increase in
wages, despite high oil prices.
Steadily low core inflation against a background of
diverse processes
Since the beginning of the year, core inflation has
continued to stagnate at around 1 per cent, which
is a historically low level.
13
This low rate of core
inflation is attributable to both low domestic infla-
tion of tradable products (industrial goods and
certain food products). By contrast, inflation in
non-tradable services remained at a relatively high
level of 6–7 per cent.
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CPI and core inflation
(year-on-year indices)
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Inflation in the euro area*
(year-on-year indices)
* The September figure is Eurostat’s flash estimate.
12
The October CPI stood at 3.2 per cent, in line with our projections representing a marked drop as compared to the previous months. With core infla-
tion staying at its low growth rate, inflation in vehicle fuels saw a significant decline, due to a change in government regulations (reduction of VAT
rate on vehicle fuels) as well as external oil price developments. As a result, the gap between the CPI and core inflation has decreased somewhat.
13
Based on the annualised quarterly growth rates.
Disinflation and deflationary pressure in the scope
of tradable products is only partly attributable to
the pass-through into domestic prices of the forint
exchange rate, which began appreciating last
year. Additionally, the aforementioned decline in
world market prices also played a significant role
in domestic price developments. This is also
shown by the fact that the deflation in domestic
industrial goods, which has lasted for nearly a
year, occurred when euro area industrial goods
inflation was historically low.
14
In respect of market services, no significant disin-
flation has been perceived recently, and the infla-
tion differential between generally non-traded serv-
ices and traded industrial goods fluctuated around
the relatively high level of 7 per cent, despite the
generally low inflationary environment.
Our analyses show that the lack of decline in the
inflation differential can be broadly explained by
the fact that the increase in unit labour cost of
manufacturing, which produces tradable prod-
ucts, consistently exceeded that of the service
sector by a significant degree. This phenomenon
– which is typical of converging countries – is even
more characteristic of Hungary, as the substitution
of labour with capital is observable in manufactur-
ing, which facilitates the increase in manufacturing
labour productivity.
Oil price movements added to inflation
While core inflation stabilised at a low level, items
falling outside the scope of core inflation general-
ly boosted inflation. Although the Q2 price shock
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Core inflation
(seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter growth
rates)
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Domestic industrial goods inflation and its main 
determinants
(seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter growth
rates)
14
It is also conceivable that the low inflation of tradable products is partly attributable to strengthening market competition, when the range of products
has expanded towards lower-quality, and thus lower-price products in an increasing manner, which resulted in a downward quality rearrangement in
the consumer basket. It should further be examined to what extent this type of decline in the consumer price index represents 'real' disinflation.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
97
 Q
1
97
 Q
3
98
 Q
1
98
 Q
3
99
 Q
1
99
 Q
3
00
 Q
1
00
 Q
3
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
3
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
3
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
3
04
 Q
1
04
 Q
3
05
 Q
1
05
 Q
3
Basis points
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Basis points
Chart 2-24
Inflation differential between services and industrial
goods*
(differences of year-on-year growth rates)
* The peak in  2004 Q1 is the result of the VAT increase at the beginning of
2004, which had a stronger impact on market services prices than on the
prices of industrial goods.
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in unprocessed foods, which was discussed in
detail in our August Report, more or less unwound
by Q3, the inflationary effect of the rise in the world
market price of oil and in certain regulated prices
remained dominant. In particular, during the first
three quarters of the year domestic vehicle fuel
prices increased by 13 per cent, while oil prices in
euro increased by nearly 50 per cent, and the
HUF/EUR exchange rate was relatively stable.
15
So far, only the direct effects of oil price rises on
the prices of energy-like consumer goods has
started to appear in domestic consumer prices.
Accordingly, the unravelling of effects is in its initial
stage, and additional inflationary pressure is antic-
ipated for the future, if the oil price level remains
high for a longer period of time. These effects are
so-called indirect price effects appearing via pro-
duction costs and secondary inflationary effects
via a possible increase in inflation expectations.
The decline in inflation expectations came to a
standstill
From a monetary policy aspect it is especially
important to what extent the high oil price and the
domestic price increase in certain regulated
goods with high price transparency may result in a
rise in economic agents’ inflation expectations,
and whether monetary policy is able to anchor
expectations. Increasing inflation expectations
may result in wage inflationary pressure during the
wage bargaining process, which may cause addi-
tional acceleration of inflation as a secondary
effect. Over recent months central banks of devel-
oped economies have also called attention to the
danger of a persistently high oil price level and the
possibility of an increase in inflation expectations.
Based on the surveys conducted among Hun-
garian households, no clear signs of increase can
be seen in either perceived or expected inflation.
However, it is worthy of note that according to the
surveys by both GKI and Medián, last year’s
downward trend came to a standstill in the first half
of this year, and the indices have stagnated in the
last two to three quarters.
15
For more information on of the effects of world oil price changes on the Hungarian economy, please see Box 3.2.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ja
n.
 0
1
M
ar
. 0
1
M
ay
 0
1
Ju
ly
 0
1
S
ep
t. 
01
N
ov
. 0
1
Ja
n.
 0
2
M
ar
. 0
2
M
ay
 0
2
Ju
ly
 0
2
S
ep
t. 
02
N
ov
. 0
2
Ja
n.
 0
3
M
ar
. 0
3
M
ay
 0
3
Ju
ly
 0
3
S
ep
t. 
03
N
ov
. 0
3
Ja
n.
 0
4
M
ar
. 0
4
M
ay
 0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
S
ep
t. 
04
N
ov
. 0
4
Ja
n.
 0
5
M
ar
. 0
5
M
ay
 0
5
Ju
ly
 0
5
S
ep
t. 
05
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Expected price increase for the next 12 months
Perceived change in living costs
Chart 2-25
Perceived and expected price changes based on the GKI
survey*
* Balance indicator, i.e. a move in the positive (negative) direction means
the increase (decline) in inflation perception or expectation. Source: GKI
survey, DG Ecofin data base.
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Inflation perceived and expected by households 
according to the MNB survey*
(for the last and next 12 months)
* Based on the household survey commissioned by the MNB and conducted
by Medián.
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According to our projection, several demand and
supply factors underlying the decline in core
inflation to the current low level are expected to
have an inflationary effect in the coming two
years. Although this trend is expected to be tem-
porarily masked by the price-reducing effect of
the VAT reduction in 2006, core inflation is
expected to increase from the current level of
approximately 1.5 per cent to nearly 3 per cent
by 2007.
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Core inflation developments*
(annualised quarterly changes)
* MNB estimate.
In our forecast, in accordance with our rules, the values of
individual factors in the last full month (currently 2005
October) are projected over the whole forecast horizon
(presently, the first 10 working days of October 2005 consti-
tute the reference period.) The exception is our oil price
assumption, where the forward oil price path is used. In terms
of year-end values, a 6 per cent central bank base rate, 6.67
per cent five-year yield, exchange rates of EUR/HUF 251.7
and EUR/USD 1.202 were used in our calculations. A sus-
tained price path of around 60 USD/barrel was assumed as the
Brent oil price.
Our forecast was prepared on the basis of the adopted tax laws
and the 2006 budget bill. On aggregate, the adopted and
planned measures will result in fiscal easing. In parallel with
this, as was analysed in detail in the MNB’s Report on
Convergence, fiscal policy has deviated from the path under-
taken in the Convergence Programme, which is inadmissible
over the longer term. The consolidation required for the path
undertaken in the Convergence Programme would presum-
ably involve a slowdown in economic growth in the short run,
while the effect on inflation depends on whether consolidation
is enforced by the autonomous decision of fiscal policy or by
international money market investors. Despite the uncertain-
ties and in accordance with our forecasting rules, in the base
scenario we assumed the continuation of October’s average of
both the central bank base rate and the exchange rate.
Box 3-1  Assumptions
Pick-up in domestic business activity, with stable
growth
It is expected that on our forecast horizon eco-
nomic growth will continue to be around the level
of the past two years, i.e. around 4 per cent.
16
In
terms of the driving forces of economic growth,
domestic demand is anticipated to play a some-
what more important role than external demand in
the coming two years. This will result in a slight
inflationary pressure from the demand side.
Although the moderate growth in external
demand is expected to continue, it will be slower
than in the last two years. The underlying reason
is that the expected pick-up in European domes-
tic demand will be offset by the effect of persist-
ently high oil prices, which has a restraining
influence on economic growth. Overall, based on
our forecast, the size of Hungary’s export market
may grow by 4–5 per cent in the coming two
years.
At the same time, a gradual pick-up in domestic
demand is anticipated, and the expected devel-
opments in both consumption and investment will
play a role in this regard. Household consump-
tion’s becoming more dynamic will basically stem
from the increase in household disposable
income, fostered in part by the VAT reduction in
2006, the rise in minimum wages and increases in
the family support scheme. In addition, continued
financial deepening is also expected, which may
be coupled with a further expansion of house-
holds’ borrowing opportunities. We expect a slow-
down in the rate of investment growth in our pro-
jection, mostly as a result of a slowdown in corpo-
rate investment and a pick-up in government
investment in 2006. 
Varying effect of supply-side factors of inflation over
the longer term
Supply-side factors of inflation currently have a
disinflationary effect. In the coming two years,
however, many of these factors, e.g. the rising
imported inflation, the decline in the disinflationary
effect of competition and the exchange rate, which
has weakened slightly compared to the last one
and a half years, point to inflation, which is higher
than it is at the present time. In addition, the his-
torically high oil price level, mainly as a cost factor
appearing at several points in the production
process, may also generate inflationary pressure
in the future. At the same time, labour market
trends are not expected to exert inflationary pres-
sure; on the contrary, the reduction of employers’
social security contribution in 2007 may temporar-
ily result in a lower rate of price increases. The
expected gradual turnaround in the disinflation
process which has been experienced during the
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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The computation of GDP by the CSO under the new methodology can generate an additional 0.3-0.4 percentage point yearly growth rate in the com-
ing years. For more information on this topic, see Box 2.2.
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last one year will temporarily be masked by the
VAT reduction in 2006. The aforementioned fac-
tors are examined in more detail below.
Apart from the oil price increase, the inflationary
environment has essentially been favourable up to
now. Liberalisation of the global economy exerts a
disinflationary effect via several channels, such as
wage containment, greater competition and
improving productivity. Presumably, partly as a
result of the processes outlined above, consumer
price inflation of industrial goods sank to its all-
time low in the euro area. This disinflationary effect
evolved in a shorter period of time in converging
countries, including Hungary, than in developed
countries, since the transformation of economic
structures (e.g. that of trade) was also inevitably
more dynamic, and EU accession further enhan-
ced this process.
At the same time, it is noteworthy that export pri-
ces of processed goods and producer prices
have been increasing in the euro area for one and
a half years. The gap between consumer and pro-
ducer prices is, on the one hand, attributable to
the higher trade purchase prices’ delayed appear-
ance in consumer prices, and on the other hand, it
may be explained by the further strengthening of
competition as well. Considering all this, our fore-
cast reckons with the international inflationary
environment becoming somewhat less favourable
on the forecast horizon, due partly to the persist-
ently high oil price as well. 
We believe that fierce competition may also have
played an important role in the recent decline in
domestic core inflation. Competition may continue
to strengthen in the coming years as well, although
as structural transition in the trading sector
progress, its disinflationary effect is expected to
gradually wane.
In accordance with our basic assumption, our pro-
jection is that in the coming two years the forint
exchange rate will be slightly more devalued than
in the last one and a half years, which is also a fac-
tor pointing to higher inflation.
In contrast to the above factors, the effect of
labour market developments in the next two years
are expected to become varied in terms of infla-
tion, but on the whole, this will not result in higher
inflation. In this regard, two important changes in
labour market regulations can be expected in the
coming two years. First, the minimum wage will
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increase significantly in 2006, which will result in
somewhat higher wages and an increase in labour
cost. Then, at end-2006 the lump-sum health care
contribution will be terminated, and at the beginn-
ing of 2007 the social security contribution paid by
employers will be reduced. The reduction of con-
tributions implies a decline in labour cost and an
increase in the profitability of corporations, which
may gradually result in lower sales/consumer
prices.
17
Labour market developments are expected to
result in an increase in the number of employed,
due to the external upswing becoming sustain-
able, the gradual resolution of the structural labour
shortage and the reduction of employers’ contri-
butions. However, continued substitution of labour
with capital and the rationalisation of labour have
a negative effect on employment growth. Overall,
during the projection period the increase in labour
demand is expected to exceed the increase in
labour supply, which will result in growing employ-
ment and a gradual decline in the rate of unem-
ployment.
18
In addition to demand and supply factors, inflation
developments may be substantially affected by
the inflation expectations of economic agents.
Therefore, it may be an important sign that accord-
ing to surveys, the one-and-a-half-year-long
decline in perceived and expected inflation came
to an end in the last quarter, despite the gradual
fall in core inflation. Our projection is based on the
assumption that the recent higher-than-inflation
price increase of items falling outside the scope of
core inflation will not be included in inflation
expectations over a longer term. Similarly, it was
also assumed that the general price level reducing
effect of the VAT reduction in 2006 will not become
a lasting part of inflation expectations either.
Summarising the aforementioned factors, it can be
ascertained that on our forecast horizon a gradual
increase in inflation can mainly be expected in the
scope of goods exposed to import competition,
where the effect of growing imported inflation
appears directly, and where disinflationary pres-
sure following from strengthening competition and
the past period’s stable exchange rate may
decline.
19
At the same time, the inflation differential
between items exposed to import competition and
market services is expected to shrink only slowly.
This is explained both by the persistent difference
between the two sectors’ productivities and the
slight pick-up in domestic demand.
Overall, other factors are expected to reduce 
inflation and carry significant risk at the same time
As for the items falling outside of the scope of core
inflation, an overall price increase around inflation
is projected.
20
Within this, however, vehicle fuel
prices are expected to remain practically unchan-
ged, which is justified by the stability of forward
prices used in our projection. At the same time, it
should be noted that the effects of the significant
oil price increases in the last year appeared only
partly, which may cause inflationary pressure over
the longer term. 
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17
Over the longer term, this may slightly be cushioned by the companies, which, as a result of the wage bargaining process, may gradually let their
employees have a part of the increased profit in the form of higher wages, which may result in a somewhat higher inflation via indirect effects. This is
all the more likely, as the minimum wage increase in 2006 might result in wage compression.
18
However, it is important to point out that the unemployment rate is expected to decline only slowly, as part of the increase in employment may be
attributable to the outflow from inactives.
19
In 2006, the aforementioned long-lasting process is expected to be masked by the temporary price index reducing effect of the VAT reduction. 
20
In case of regulated products, in accordance with our forecasting rules, we calculated with a price increase 1.3 times higher than core inflation. As
for unprocessed food, a slight price rise around inflation and starting from the current price level is expected, propelled by the assumed develop-
ments in agricultural production paths.
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Within the framework of the five-year tax reduction
programme, the highest VAT tax rate will be
reduced from 25 per cent to 20 per cent as of
2006. As direct effect of this, the consumer price
index is estimated to temporarily decline by 1.4
percentage points in 2006. Therefore, and due to
the low inflation dynamics of non-core items, the
average consumer price index may fall close to 1
World market prices of oil increased from the early-2005 level
of around 40 dollars per barrel to over 60 dollars by the mid-
dle of the year, and have more or less stabilised at that level
since then. In our projection, in accordance with the October
average forward prices, we calculated with unchanged oil
prices of 60 dollars per barrel. The question is how this affect-
ed our current forecast. As it was mentioned before, oil price
developments influence domestic prices via several channels.
21
They are directly reflected in domestic energy prices. In addi-
tion, there are indirect effects, mainly through transportation
costs and the feed-through of commodity prices. These
impacts are cushioned or amplified by the indirect, macroeco-
nomic and labour market adjustment processes, which
depend significantly on developments in inflation expectations
and on economic policy reactions.
According to our calculations, the (almost 50 per cent) oil
price rise since end-2004 will result in a nearly 2 per cent total
increase in the consumer price level over the longer term.
Some of the relevant elements have already appeared, others
have not yet made their effect felt, or only to a limited extent.
In 2005, through the higher fuel prices, oil prices will directly
raise inflation by approximately 0.6 percentage points. Higher
petrol prices will indirectly result in an additional 0.2 per-
centage point increase in the consumer price index in 2005.
Moreover, this trend is expected to continue in the coming two
years as well, adding another approximately 0.3 per cent to
the consumer price level. It is important to emphasise that the
effect on household (regulated) energy prices has not
appeared yet; it is expected to be perceived only later (it may
represent an additional approximately 0.7 per cent total
increase). The impact of the higher oil price has mostly
appeared in regulated energy prices for companies, but it may
add another approximately 0.5 per cent to the price level
through the pass-through of production costs. All of this will
somewhat be cushioned by the demand reducing effect of
macro and labour market factors (lower real income and con-
sumption due to higher oil prices).
No sufficient information is available yet on the future timing
of the long-term effect (e.g. the future development of regulat-
ed prices is unknown). Along the path presumed in the
Report, the rise in oil prices relative to the level at end-2004
increases inflation by approximately 0.6-0.6 per cent annual-
ly in 2006 and 2007.
Box 3-2 The effect of recent oil price rise on domestic CPI
Chart 3-5 
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See the August 2004 Report.
per cent in 2006. Nevertheless, the constant price
index, which does not contain the technical effect
of the indirect tax changes, is expected to be
close to 3 percent.
Over the longer term, with the disappearance of
the direct effect of the VAT reduction, inflation is
expected to be close to 3 per cent in 2007. It is
questionable, however, whether this rate of price
increase can be considered long lasting. On the
one hand, our forecast horizon covers only two
years, during which several changes in legislation
are expected, i.e. we cannot state for sure that
economic developments will result in a steadily
low inflation rate in an autonomous manner. On the
other hand, the low core inflation rate follows from
the strongly different inflation index of the market
services sector exposed to import competition
and determined mainly by domestic factors, i.e.
the difference between the indices is great.
However, sustainable low inflation can only be
expected if it is typical of the whole economy, as a
result of a rate of wage increases and inflation
expectations consistent with the low inflation.
Quantifiable risks are balanced
The uncertainty surrounding our forecast is even
greater than usual. A significant part of this uncer-
tainty is difficult to quantify, and is rather related to
the sustainability of the macro path. What effect
the future development in the budget will have on
the risk premium is a risk of this nature. Despite
the fact that the budget bill is already known, this
risk has not lessened substantially, as the govern-
ment is trying to counterbalance the certain
decline in revenue and increase in transfer expen-
diture partly with outsourcing and partly with tem-
porary expenditure reducing measures or with
ones of dubious efficiency. Consequently, the
budget is expected to be easing again, and the
deficit will not really be perceptibly lower.
Of the quantifiable forecasting risks there are cur-
rently four major factors worth highlighting. One
important risk is how long the presently still
favourable global inflationary environment will
continue. It is also a question, how long the
strengthening of import competition (also in corre-
lation with sharpening conditions in the retail trade
sector) will have a reducing effect on the rate of
price changes. In addition, there are several signs
which indicate that inflation developments in the
rest of the world seem to be turning. We believe
that both the globally typical decline in core infla-
tion and strengthening competition may have a
waning effect on inflation developments in
Hungary, although this effect will mainly show in
2006, while its longer-term significance is much
smaller.
World market inflation factors are reflected in
energy prices. There is uncertainty to what extent
the historically high energy prices will manifest
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themselves in inflation expectations, how they will
be included in nominal wages, and thus in core
inflation. Moreover, energy prices may also feed
through into regulated energy prices, and the
magnitude and timing of this development repre-
sent a considerable uncertainty on our forecast
horizon. In our opinion, this effect increases the
probability of the evolution of higher inflation over
the entire forecast horizon.
In addition, in our risk perception the trend of nom-
inal wage growth in a lower inflation environment
also plays an important role. Its assessment is also
hard because the labour market will be affected
by two contrasting effects. The spillover effects of
the minimum wage rise in 2006 may add to wage
inflation, and thus increase the importance of cost-
push inflation factors. On the other hand, the
reduction of the social security contribution in
2007 will be a labour cost-reducing factor. The
question here is, to what extent this will be includ-
ed in the wage bargaining process. In our calcu-
lations we now assume that employers and
employees will share the reduction in contributions
to a nearly equal degree. However, we think that it
is somewhat more likely that this effect will appear
in the decline in employers’ labour costs to a larg-
er extent.
Overall, on the horizon relevant from the aspect of
monetary policy, in 2007 the uncertainty distribu-
tion of our inflation projection around the inflation
target can be considered nearly symmetrical.
Risks point very slightly to lower inflation.
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Inflation fan chart*
(percentage changes on a year earlier)
* The fan chart represents the uncertainty around the central projection.
Overall, the coloured area represents a 90 per cent probability. The cen-
tral, darkest area containing the central projection for the consumer price
index illustrated by the white dotted line (as the mode of distribution) refers
to 30 per cent of the probability. The year-end points and the continuous,
horizontal line from 2007 show the value of the announced inflation tar-
gets.
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4. 1 Background information on the projections
Although several data have been modified in our
present forecast as a result of macroeconomic
information disclosed since the publication of the
August 2005 Report, the broad evolution of the
projected inflation and main macroeconomic vari-
ables remain essentially unchanged.
As the 2005 Q3 developments in consumer price
inflation corresponded to our implicit short-term
projections set forth in the August Report, our
forecast on the 2005 annual average CPI growth
has not been modified.
The primary reason for the 0.5 percentage point
reduction in our 2006 inflation projection is that
after the draft 2006 budget and tax bill was sub-
mitted, better estimates could be given for the
effects of the announced regulatory and tax-relat-
ed measures, which could merely be presumed
for lack of more specific data three months earlier.
Among the items adding to core inflation the
excise tax on wine was not raised (we assumed
higher rate in August to offset revenue losses due
to lower VAT rates), and the excise tax on tobacco
was raised to a lesser extent. Besides these items,
that are the most relevant in lower core inflation,
our expectation on unprocessed food prices for
2006 also changed downwards. Regulated prices
will also contribute to lower annual inflation since
natural gas prices for households will be raised at
a later period of the year than we thought in
August. This altogether would imply a 0.7 percent-
age point deduction in our average annual CPI
inflation for 2006, but this will partly be offset by
higher fuel and energy prices.
Due to the offsetting effects of conflicting factors,
our inflation projection for 2007 remains funda-
mentally unchanged, although the core inflation
projection was decreased. Although demand is
slightly more vigorous, our assumption on the HUF
exchange rate is somewhat lower and the differ-
ence between the rates of inflation in market serv-
ices and tradables have been revised down, as in
our opinion disparity between the productivity indi-
cators of the two sectors does not give grounds for
assuming long-term durability of the current trend
of inflation. Greater emphasis has been laid on the
fact that in 2007, lower social security contribu-
tions will result in higher corporate profits and
allow companies to cut their prices (this effect is
slightly offset by the fact that companies share
part of the increment in profits with their employ-
ees in the form of higher wages).
Economic growth is projected to undergo similar
development as in August 2005, albeit the FISIM-
revision explained in detail in Box 2.2 will enhance
annual GDP growth by 0.3 to 0.5 percentage
points over the entire projection horizon, at the
same time we expect stronger domestic demand.
The underlying reasons for the higher projections
for household consumption and the gross fixed
capital formation include more favourable-than-
expected 2005 Q2 consumption and corporate
investment data. In addition, over the projection
horizon, an upward revision of the August projec-
tion is justified by the aforementioned tax and reg-
ulatory measures in the case of consumption and
the recently promised major corporate and gov-
ernment investments in the case of fixed capital
formation. Despite these, overall domestic use will
not improve in 2005 as (due amongst other things
to statistical discrepancy) inventory investment
has been lower than expected. For this reason, the
upward revision of our projection for 2005 GDP
reflects more favourable net exports. In 2006 and
2007, however, more intensive increase in domes-
tic use is expected to generate faster GDP growth
than projected in the August Report, while net
exports (especially in 2007) may even be less
favourable than expected in August. In an assess-
ment of our projections, the fact that (as explained
in Box 2.2) our projections are based on the
national account time series specified prior to the
last revision by CSO.
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Table 4-1
Changes in the central projections relative to August
(percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise indicated)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Actual/ Projection
Estimate Aug. Current Aug. Current Aug. Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation
1
5.9 2.2 2.2 1.1 0.8 3.2 2.8
Consumer price index (CPI) 6.8 3.6 3.6 1.6 1.1 2.9 2.8
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 2.0 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0
Fiscal demand effect
2
-0.6 0.8 1.0 0.5-1.0* 1.0 (-0.5)-0.0* (-0.5)-0.0*
Household consumption
3
2.5 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.7 3.0 3.2
Memo: Household consumption expenditure
3
3.1 2.7 3.1 3.8 4.3 3.5 3.7
Gross fixed capital formation
3
7.9 5.4 8.1 4.9 5.4 2.1 2.9
Domestic absorption
3
2.2 1.2 0.9 5.7*** 6.1*** 2.7*** 3.1***
Exports 14.9 11.1 10.3 8.8 9.2 9.2 9.2
Imports
4
11.6 8.0 6.6 10.6*** 11.1*** 7.9*** 8.2***
GDP
3
based on earlier data series 4.2 (4.0)** 3.4 (3.6)** 3.8 (4.0)** 3.9 4.2 3.8 3.9
under the new methodology 4.6 (4.4)** 4.2 (4.4)** 4.5 4.3
Current account deficit
4
As a percentage of GDP 8.8 7.6 8.1 8.6*** 9.1*** 7.6*** 8.5***
EUR billions 7.1 6.7 7.0 8.0*** 8.3*** 7.6*** 8.3***
External financing requirement
4
As a percentage of GDP 8.5 6.9 7.4 7.8*** 8.4*** 6.8*** 7.7***
Labour market
National economy gross earnings
3
7.1 8.2 7.9 6.5 6.7 5.4 6.1
National economy employment
4
-0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.7
Private sector gross average earnings  9.3 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.3 5.6 6.5
Private sector employment
6
-0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.1
Private sector unit labour cost 3.5 2.9 3.2 2.1 3.1 0.2 1.2
Household real income 4.1**** 3.7 4.0 4.6 5.0 2.1 2.7
1
For technical reasons, our projected indicator may, in the short term, be different from the index published by the CSO. Over the longer term, howev-
er, both follow identical trends. The cause of this technical discrepancy is that core inflation calculated by CSO cannot accurately be reproduced from the
available group of CPI data, since the CSO breaks down several groups into core inflation items and sub-items excluded from such (e.g. pharmaceuti-
cals).  
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
In its data disclosure
in October, the CSO introduced a new methodology of data disclosure (known as the FISIM adjustment, see Box 2.2) for GDP, which entails an annual
0.3 to 0.5 percentage point higher GDP growth during the period surveyed. As no complete data series or details for GDP were available at the time of
our projection, it was prepared in accordance with the old methodology; for information purposes we disclose the GDP figures revised up in accordance
with the estimated impact of the new methodology. 
4
From 2004 on the uncertainty in trade statistics may imply higher actual values for the current
account deficit / external financing requirement than the official data and our projections based on the latter. 
5
The 13th month salaries carried over from
2004 to January 2005 in the public sector cause a downward bias in the 2004 wage growth indicator and an upward bias in 2005 
6
According to the CSO
labour force survey. * Assumption for the fiscal impulse inherently consistent with the macroeconomic path; due to the lack of a draft bill on the 2007
budget, we cannot provide a detailed fiscal projection. ** Adjusted for leap-year effect. *** Our projection allows for the adverse impact of the procure-
ment of Gripen fighter aircraft on the current account and its contribution to an increase in public consumption and imports. **** MNB estimate.
Among our major assumptions, rise in the futures
rate of oil prices must be highlighted once again.
In addition, our projection has been made with
lower interest rate and weaker exchange rate
assumptions than in August 2005.
Impact of an alternative interest rate and exchange
rate assumption on our projection
In line with our earlier practice, the effect of sub-
stituting our interest and exchange rate assump-
tions with the October expectations of Reuters
analysts on our projection are outlined.
The assumption underlying our main scenario of
the central bank base rate is a fixed 6 per cent
interest rate over the entire projection horizon.
Reuters’ analysts expect further, albeit relatively
moderate decrease in the central bank base rate,
which would result in nearly 30-bp lower rate than
we assume by late 2006. Our exchange rate
assumption for the entire forecast period has
been fixed at the average exchange rate of the
trading days of October 2005, i.e. EUR/HUF
251.7. The average of professional analysts’
exchange rate expectations is slightly more
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Table 4-2
Changes in major assumptions relative to August 2005*
August 2005 projection Current projection Change
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Central bank base rate 
6.75 6.75 6.75 6.00 6.00 6.00 -0.75*** -0.75*** -0.75***
(per cent)**
5-year yield (per cent)** 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.67 6.67 6.67 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
EUR/HUF exchange rate 246.9 246.5 246.5 248.0 251.7 251.7 0.4 2.1 2.1
EUR/USD exchange rate 
124.5 120.5 120.5 124.8 120.2 120.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.2
(cent)
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 54.1 59.5 58.0 55.0 61.0 60.0 1.7 2.6 3.5
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 10,788 12,181 11,880 10,987 12,782 12,572 1.8 4.9 5.8
* Annual averages, from 2005 Q3, based on the July 2005 average exchange rates and futures oil prices. ** Year-end figures. *** Difference, percentage points.
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depreciated (for late 2006, the difference is near-
ly 1.2 per cent).
The interest and exchange rates expected by
Reuters’ analysts for the end of 2005 are roughly the
same, while those relevant to the end of 2006 are
0.2 percentage points higher than the MNB’s infla-
tion projection, and by the end of 2007, this differ-
ence will have dropped again to 0.1 per cent. If cal-
culated using the alternative interest and exchange
rate assumptions, our GDP growth projection would
be nearly 0.1 per cent higher in 2006, whereas the
difference would be insignificant in 2007.
A comparison of our projections with those of other
institutions
Similarly to the situation a quarter of a year earlier,
our projections for the developments in inflation
and economic activity in 2005 are broadly identi-
cal with other analysts’ opinions. The differences
anticipated for 2006 concern primarily inflation
(our projection is nearly one percentage point
lower than the average of other analysts’ projec-
tions), and in addition to the disparity between the
underlying assumptions, such significant diver-
gences are, for the most part, due to the different
judgement of the effects of the announced gov-
ernment measures. Although in terms of 2006
growth, we are slightly more optimistic than the
analysts, we expect higher government deficit and
current account deficit. The information available
for analysts on 2007 is rare. The MNB’s inflation
and GDP forecasts are roughly similar to those
forecasters’ who already disclosed their projec-
tions for 2007. But the MNB expects slower foreign
demand and higher current account deficit
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2005 2006 2007
Consumer price index  (average annual increase, percentage)
MNB 3.6 1.1 2.8
Consensus Economics (November 2005)
1
3.5 – 3.6 – 3.7 1.3 – 2.0 (1.9)* – 3.2 n/a.
OECD (November 2005) 3.7 2.0 2.7
European Commission (autumn 2005) 3.7 2.0 3.0
IMF (September 2005) 4.0 3.6 n/a.
Reuters-survey (November 2005)
1
3.5 – 3.6 – 3.6 1.2 – 1.8 – 2.4 2.4 – 3.0 – 3.8
World Bank (October 2005) 3.6 2.2 n/a.
GDP (annual growth, percentage)
MNB 3.8 (4.0**) 4.2** 3.9
Consensus Economics (November 2005)
1
3.2 – 3.9 – 4.2 3.5 – 4.0 – 4.4 n/a.
OECD (November 2005) 4.2*** 4.5*** 4.3***
European Commission (autumn 2005) 3.7 3.9 3.9
IMF (September 2005) 3.4 3.6 n/a.
Reuters-survey (November 2005)
1
3.8 – 4.0 – 4.2 3.5 – 4.1 – 4.5 n/a.
World Bank (October 2005) 3.5 3.8 n/a.
Current account deficit (in EUR billions)
MNB 7.0 8.3**** 8.3****
Consensus Economics (November 2005)
1,2
6.3 – 7.1 – 7.7 6.5 – 7.7 – 8.8 n/a.
Reuters-survey (November 2005)
1
6.5 – 6.9 – 7.6 6.8 – 7.4 – 8.2 n/a.
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 8.0 9.1**** 8.5****
OECD (November 2005) 8.4 8.7 8.5
European Commission (autumn 2005) 8.4 8.4 7.7
IMF (September 2005) 8.5 8.0 n/a.
World Bank (October 2005) 7.6 8.2 n/a.
General government deficit (according to ESA-95, as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 7.5 – 8.1***** 7.8 – 8.9***** n/a.
Consensus Economics (November 2005)
1
5.4 – 6.5 – 7.9 5.5 – 6.5 – 8.3 n/a.
European Commission (autumn 2005)
4
6.1 6.7 6.9
Reuters-survey (November 2005)
1
6.1 – 7.4 – 8.0 5.2 – 7.8 – 10.0 n/a.
World Bank (October 2005) 6.1 5.7 n/a.
Projections on the size of Hungary’s export market
MNB 4.1 5.3 4.9
OECD (November 2005)
3
4.3 6,3 7.3
European Commission (autumn 2005)
3
4.9 6.0 5.9
IMF (September 2005)
3
4.2 4.9 n/a.
Projections on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trading partners
MNB 1.5 1.9 2.0
OECD (November 2005)
3
1.6 2.1 2.4
European Commission (autumn 2005)
3
1.7 2.1 2.4
IMF (September 2005)
3
1.7 2.1 n/a.
Table 4-3
The MNB’s main scenario versus other projections
MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections. 
* The consensus in parentheses has been calculated excluding analysts who do not take account of the tax effect.** Adjusted for leap-year effect. *** OECD’s
GDP-forecasts already include the estimated effect of the FISIM-revision. **** Our projection takes account of the approximately 0.5 per cent GDP-pro-
portionate negative effect on the current account resulting from the Gripen fighter procurement. ***** The band indicates the uncertainty of the application
of the ESA methodology in Hungary.
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’ responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated in italics for the
Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate dispersion. 
2
The survey specifies current account projections in US dollars, therefore they
are converted at the EUR/USD exchange rate assumed in the current Report. 
3
Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions
regarding individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating the MNB’s own external demand indicators. This way, the forecast
may differ from the numbers published by the aforesaid institutions. 
4
For the sake of comparability the projection of the European Commission was cor-
rected taking into account payments to the private pension fund system.
Source: Consensus Economics Inc. (London) Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (November 2005); European Commission Economic Forecasts, autumn
2005; IMF World Economic Outlook (September 2005); Reuters survey, November 2005; World Bank EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report (October 2005);
OECD Economic Outlook (November 2005). Projections by the OECD are not yet public and will be disclosed later.
Actual/Estimate Projection
2003 2004 2005 2006
1) GFS balance -6.0 -6.5 -6.1 -8.0
2) Adjustment of the balance of interest -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2
payments according to ESA
3) Other corrections on ESA basis -1.3 0.4 (-1.1)-(1.5) (+0.4)-(-0,7)
4) ESA balance (1+2+3) -7.4 -6.5 (-7.5)-(-8.1) (-7.8)-(-8.9)
5) Balance according to national definition** -6.5 -5.4 (-6.2)-(-6.6) (-6.4)-(-7.5)
6) Quasi-fiscal expenditures and other adjustments -1.2 -1.7 -1.4 -2.2
7) Augmented (SNA) balance (1+6)*** -8.6 -8.2 -9.4 -10.0
8) Augmented (SNA) primary balance -4.7 -4.1 -5.3 -6.4
9) Fiscal impact on demand -0.4 -0.6 +1.0 +1.0
Table 4-4
Fiscal indicators in our baseline scenario
(as a percentage of GDP)*
* Based on estimated GDP without the so-called FISIM adjustment. The future application of the new GDP numbers would decrease deficits by approx-
imately 0.1 percentage points every year. ** Modification of the ESA deficit, including the revenues and expenditures of private pension funds. As of 2007,
this indicator will not be applicable, and thus in the spring 2007 notification (pertaining to 2006,) Eurostat will no longer specify Hungary's ESA balance
on this basis. *** Cash-based deficit of the general government excluding certain extraordinary income and expenditure, and including the income from
quasi-fiscal activities recorded outside the general government. MNB estimate.
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4. 2 Developments in general government deficit indicators
In the course of 2005, fiscal policy has been con-
siderably easing aggregate demand and will con-
tinue to do so in 2006 (in our estimate total easing
amounts to about one per cent of GDP), which
means that the broadly defined government sector
increasingly raises the income of the other sectors
compared to 2004.
Without further balance-improving measures,
instead of declining, the ESA deficit may even
rise significantly in 2006 compared this year’s
expected figure. The reason for this is that invest-
ment cuts, reduced financing of local govern-
ments and the curtailment of government institu-
tions’ expenditures can only partially offset the
revenue-decreasing impacts of tax cuts and
increases in welfare expenditures. Moreover, the
deficit cuts planned by the government for 2006
envisage the ‘outsourcing’ of a considerable part
of government investments to participants falling
outside budgetary accounts. This raises several
problems. First, their assessment under the ESA
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Chart 4-3
Fiscal demand impact, 1996–2006*
(as a percentage of GDP)
* Including the effect of Gripen purchase.
method is uncertain. Second, they will cut the
deficit at most on a single occasion, and conceal
developments leading to persistently high
indebtedness. The effect of the latter is clearly
shown in the fact that, unless new balance-
improving measures are taken, by 2007 the exist-
ing government liabilities and autonomous fiscal
developments will have generated a further
increase in the deficit in an amount exceeding 1
per cent of GDP. The budget is rapidly moving
away from the deficit target approved in the
Convergence Programme and consequently, its
realisation will require significant budgetary
adjustments.
Reasons for the high 2005 ESA deficit
This year, the ESA deficit will exceed even the
upper limit of the band set up in the August 2005
Report, as pursuant to the recommendations and
statements made by Eurostat, the revenues
realised on earlier performed motorway construc-
tion cannot be settled as deficit-decreasing rev-
enues under the ESA method. NA Rt.’s 2005
motorway construction costs must also be record-
ed in the ESA balance, as neither construction
activity nor its financing have been transferred to
ÁAK Rt. during the year, thus they are considered
to have been performed by NA Rt., which falls
within the scope of the general government.
22
The
projection published in the August 2005 Inflation
Report for the expected ESA balance considered
the methodological risk only regarding the rev-
enues from the already existing motorway sec-
tions as we had no reliable information on the
schedule and financing conditions of the con-
struction activity.
In our main scenario, the cash-based general gov-
ernment deficit resulting from revenues in the
social security lower than government expecta-
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22
For further details see Box 1.2 in the October 2005 issue of the MNB’s Report on Financial Stability.
In 2005 Q2 and Q3, the balance of other credits to government
increased significantly in the balances of mortgage banks. Rise
in the government’s debt to financial institutions was primari-
ly due to the fact that in contrast to earlier practice, the gov-
ernment delays payment of the interest subsidy to housing
loans. The increase recorded in the other credit of mortgage
banks engaged in granting preferential housing loans against
the government in the first ten months of 2005 suggests that
unpaid interest subsidy may amount to HUF 50–60 billion. By
way of its spokesman, the Ministry of Finance announced that
the deferment would be performed in accordance with an
agreement concluded with the mortgage banks, whereby the
government had undertaken to reimburse the banks for their
lost interest income.
If the interest subsidy is paid in 2005, this delay will only
affect course of the (cash-based) GFS deficit, not the ESA
deficit (i.e. it modifies the GFS/ESA difference). If part of the
interest subsidy is carried over to 2006, the 2005 accrual-
based ESA deficit must indicate the total amount of expendi-
ture due and payable in 2005, whereas the GFS deficit indi-
cates only the amount of interest subsidy actually paid in
2005. Consequently, delay in payments may reduce the 2005
cash-based deficit by up to 0.2-0.3 per cent of GDP and debit
next year’s budget. According to currently available informa-
tion, it cannot be judged if the liabilities incurred as a result
of delayed payments are included in the government debt.
This increases the methodological risk related to the end-2005
government debt.
Box 4-1 Delaying payments related to interest subsidies of mortgage loans
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tions overspending may be 0.5 per cent of GDP
higher
23
than presumed by the government in
September 2005, when it announced raising the
ESA deficit target to 7.4 per cent. Favourable
developments in certain revenue (value added
taxes and income from contributions) and expen-
diture items at the end of the year may reduce the
deficit and bring it closer to the target. Deferred
payments and technical changes in settlement
dates (part of certain expenditures, such as for
example settlements related to housing subsidies,
may be carried over to the next year – cf. the box
above) can only have transient effects, and will
increase the deficit in subsequent years.
The 2006 ESA deficit target is unlikely to be achieved
without further balance improving measures
The budget bill specifies a 6.1 per cent deficit tar-
get. According to the ESA statistical accounts this
is in fact equal to a 6.6 per cent target since the
expenses relating to the Gripen purchase are not
accounted for in the ESA deficit target.
24
Procurement of the Gripen fighter aircrafts, how-
ever, (in a way consistent with the statistics of the
balance of payments and the financial accounts of
the national economy) should be accounted for at
the time of their arrival, in line with the view of the
European Commission. The assessment of the
planned deficit target is hindered by the fact that –
in contrast to this year – the cost of the new motor-
way construction comprising a major part of gov-
ernment-financed investments has fallen outside
the budget and its accounting for according to
ESA methodology is problematic (see below).
The government’s deficit target is expected to be
significantly exceeded in the absence of further
balance improving measures. Therefore, a 7.8 per
cent ESA deficit seems most likely according to
our baseline projection. Our projection for the
23
Excluding cash-based revenues earned in relation to the privatisation of the Budapest Airport expected this year. The annual fiscal projection pub-
lished on 15 November 2005 on the website of the Ministry of Finance indicates a major increase in revenues for December in the line dedicated
to revenues raised from the sale of government property. This is presumably related to the sales of the Budapest Airport. We assume that no part
of the revenues realised from the sales of the Budapest Airport can be settled in the ESA balance; so that it increases the ESA-GFS difference.
24
According to the submitted draft budget bill, under a time schedule of arrival in 2006. See Page 344 of draft act T/17700. The statistical adjust-
ment performed in relation to this procurement may subsequently change in function of further specification of the conditions and the actual
arrival date of the aircraft. 
Table 4-5
The MNB's projected 2006 ESA balance relative to the official ESA deficit target of the government
(as a percentage of GDP)
1. Deficit target according to national definition* 4.7
2. Adjustment for private pension funds 1.4
Target interpretation 3. Government's deficit target adjusted for private pension funds (1+2)* 6.1
4. Settlement of accounts with the procurement of Gripen fighters 0.5
5. Planned ESA-deficit (3+4) 6.6
Performance risk
6. Assumed slippage 1.2
7. Expected ESA deficit (5+6) 7.8
Methodological risk
8. Methodological risk (motorway construction included in the ESA-deficit) 1.1
9. Expected ESA deficit with methodological risks 7.8-8.9
* Official deficit target of the government pursuant to the draft budget bill.
2006 cash based deficit – in the absence of addi-
tional measures – foresees a deficit of around 8.0
per cent as opposed to a 6.9 per cent deficit
planned by the government. The budget bill
planned next year’s targets relying on the budget
figures from 2005 which were optimistic in several
respects (income from contributions, pension
expenses, family support expenditures, and local
governments’ expenditure). Furthermore, in our
view, budget institutions will not be able to finance
next year’s wage increases for government
employees.
25
Thus, when looking at central gov-
ernment targets we assumed that building up
‘chapter-based’ general government reserves of
around 0.3 per cent of GDP will not be effective
during the year, but this amount will be spent (it
will partly be used to cover the promised wage
increase).
A major part of the so-called performance risks
(see line 6 in the table above) incorporated in our
baseline projection is due to our larger deficit pro-
jection of social security and local government
sub-systems. In the case of social security we
think that the contributions have been over-
planned, while expenditures underplanned (espe-
cially those related to pharmaceuticals and pen-
sions). As far as local governments are con-
cerned, a reduction in central government financ-
ing will probably lead to an increase in deficit, and
thus the deficit of this sub-system may evolve in
line with the usual cycle (at around 0.5 per cent of
GDP).
Budget developments planned for 2006 are simul-
taneously characterised by attempts to decrease
both the tax burden and expenditures. The easing
of the tax burden would be carried out primarily
through a lower standard VAT rate and the reduc-
tion of lump-sum health contributions. In our esti-
mate, the primary effect of the tax reduction plan
would amount to 1.8 per cent of GDP, while sec-
ond round effects – as savings on expenditures
will also appear in the budget due to a lower VAT
rate – combined with the effect of measures taken
to increase tax revenues will reach an estimated
0.7 per cent of GDP. Thus, the net effect of tax
changes is estimated to amount to 1.1 per cent of
GDP which means that the central government will
collect 1.1 per cent less tax from the other sectors
of the economy.
26
The government is planning to counterbalance
this easing in taxes with intensive tightening on
investments, keeping the same nominal level of
institutional and chapter expenditure in total and
reducing the level of local government financing,
while significantly increasing family support
expenditures. As far as the central budget is con-
cerned, major investments would only take place
when co-financed by the European Union except
for motorway construction which would be real-
ized in a form falling outside the accounts of the
general government. It is still uncertain how Euro-
stat will assess this. The reduction of the GDP-pro-
portionate expenditure targets at the chapter level
and of government institutions could lead to a sit-
uation where the institutions would try to shift a
part of their expenditure liabilities for next year to
the following year and/or they will not comprehen-
sively discharge all their tasks.
27
A major reduction in financing the local govern-
ment sub-system (we foresee an approximately
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25
The government’s wish to increase wages has been announced already, but no agreement has been reached in this regard with interest repre-
sentation organizations.
26
In comparison to a hypothetical assumption ('neutral' case) that the 2006 tax revenues would rise in proportion to the increase in tax bases, or in
other words, the tax burden would remain unchanged in proportion to GDP.
27
According to the budget bill, the carry-over holding cannot be less at the end of next year than the opening amount at the beginning of the year.
In our estimate, this measure means the shifting forward of liabilities of around 2 per cent of GDP. A delay in fulfilling payment obligations repre-
sents an extraction of funds from the economy and thus at the same time it poses a permanent future risk of meeting Maastricht fiscal criteria.
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0.5 per cent cut in funds provided that the per-
sonal income tax blocking is effective) is consid-
ered to be a risky measure, as the government is
expecting a major adjustment in a segment of the
general government for the control of which it
lacks effective means.
Calculation of the planned 2006 ESA deficit is
doubtful
The government plans to transfer the construction
of the new motorway sections from NA Rt. to
another company not classified under the general
government in the currently applicable statistics.
Whether the company commissioned with the con-
struction of motorways actually falls within or out-
side the general government will be decided by
Eurostat on the basis of criteria defined in advance
(corporate management, ownership structure, the
ratio of market revenues to costs, etc.). Until a
decision is made by Eurostat, in the 2006 ESA
deficit this carries a considerable upside risk
amounting to 1.1 per cent of GDP, also reflected in
our projection band between 7.8 and 8.9 per cent.
Regardless of the above, as the investment
depends on government decision and the compa-
ny will presumably be in government ownership,
this item is included, as always, in the so-called
augmented SNA deficit on account of its econom-
ic effect.
28
Projection on the 2006 cash-based deficit involves
considerable risks 
The 2006 deficit is expected at around 8 per cent
in our baseline case and is surrounded by risks
amounting to nearly 1 per cent on each side. These
risks involve the expected revenues, open-end
expenditures and the uncertainty of the efficiency
of cuts and freezes on central expenditures.
The risk carried in targeted tax revenues are high-
er than usual, as several types of tax will undergo
major changes and new tax items will be intro-
duced. The margin of error is higher than usual for
the given interval, especially when the effects of
newly introduced taxes are estimated.
As the government has made the responsibilities
of cutting expenditures an institutional compe-
28
See the related OECD study: Koen – van den Noord: 2005. OECD Working Paper 417.
Central projection on the GFS balance: -8.0 per cent
Tax revenues are higher than assumed in the central +0.3 Tax revenues remain below the central projection. -0.3
projection.
More income is realised from contributions on account +0.2 Measures taken to reduce spending are performed -0.3
of a better 2005 base. only in part.
Part of the general government reserves assigned to +0.2 Higher-than-expected open-end expenditures. -0.1
chapters can be frozen.
Local governments' cash-based deficit is lower. +0.1 Investment spending by local governments exceeds -0.1
expectations, due to investment cycle.
Impact of favourable developments on the balance +0.8 Impact of unfavourable developments on the balance -0.8
GFS deficit in a favourable case -7.2 GFS deficit in an unfavourable case -8.8
Table 4-6
Uncertainty surrounding the MNB’s 2006 projection
(as a percentage of GDP)
tence, it has become more difficult to assess to
what degree the expenditure reduction targets are
achievable. In the draft bill, the appropriations of
institutional expenditures have practically been
frozen, which may generate tension among institu-
tions during the performance of their tasks.
Although it is not included in the above table, a
factor that may considerably increase the deficit
is the eventual payment of quasi-fiscal debts.
Large transport companies characteristically
engaged in quasi-fiscal activities (MÁV and BKV)
are expected to incur a loss next year as always,
and particularly the former company will be cred-
it insolvent without government guarantees. For
this reason, the risk of an interim debt assumption
or consolidation must be taken into consideration.
Such a transaction would increase the cash-
based (and ESA) deficit by as much as 1 or 2 per
cent of GDP (it affects the augmented deficit
measure and the demand impact indicator con-
tinuously).
Currently available information foreshadows a 
further increase in the deficit in 2007
We quantified the determinations and risks that
are the anticipated consequences of trend-like
processes and the government measures (deci-
sions) announced so far. Our estimates were
based on the following assumptions:
• We quantified the impacts of tax cuts, the antic-
ipated decrease in revenues of the measures
included in the information material titled ‘The 13
steps of the 5-year programme of tax cuts’ pub-
lished by the Government’s Spokesperson
Office (using our estimates).
• In quantifying 2007 expenditures related to the
family support scheme, relying on past experi-
ence, we assumed that they would not be val-
orised.
• In calculating the loss of one-off revenue items,
we assumed the abolition of the financial institu-
tions’ corporate tax in 2007 and we estimated a
GDP-proportionate decrease in replenishing the
compensation fund for gasoline.
• We prepared our own estimate for changes in
the accrual-based balance of interest payments.
• In other areas unaffected by determinations, rev-
enue and expenditure items are assumed to
grow along with GDP, as any departure from this
assumption presupposes measures.
In response to the determinations of which we are
currently aware, the 2007 ESA deficit would be a
further 1.1 per cent of GDP higher than previous
year, based on our current estimates. The govern-
ment measures (tax cuts) announced would add
significantly to the 2007 deficit, and factors beyond
the government’s control would be unable offset.
We also disclosed the balance of the determina-
tions for 2007 in our August Report. At that time,
we identified the anticipated impact as -0.2 per
cent of GDP. As we noted in our August Report,
our estimates for the impacts of the tax measures
then were based on the impacts disclosed on the
website of the Prime Minister’s Office that we
accepted as a given. Aware of the 2006 changes
in the tax regime, we were now able to produce a
comprehensive estimate for their anticipated
impacts. Relative to what was disclosed in our
August Report, the major changes are as follows:
• We estimate the net loss in revenues attributable
to the implementation of the 5-year programme
of tax cuts will be higher than the estimate put
forth by government (difference: -0.2 per cent).
• Pension and pharmaceutical expenditures – due
to the measures announced in the meantime –
revised up our estimate for a higher deficit (dif-
ference: -0.4 per cent).
• Our perception of local governments’ investment
cycle has also changed. Due to a decline in cen-
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tral funds committed to local governments, the
2006 basis may be lower. As a result, a reversal
in the cycle in 2007 is likely to reduce the deficit
to a lesser extent (difference: -0.1 per cent).
• Based on our forecast for the net balance of
interest payments, our estimate now shows a
smaller improvement than earlier  (the difference
being: -0.1 per cent).
2007
Impact of the announced programme of tax cuts -1.4
Second round effects of the programme of tax cuts +0.3
EU-related and customs duties +0.1
Loss of temporary income -0.2
Pension and pharmaceutical expenditures -0.1
Family support-related spending +0,1
Other additional expenditures -0.1
Local governments' investment cycle +0.1
Changes in the net balance of interest payments +0.1
Total of determinations* -1.1
Table 4-7
Disclosed measures and current trends affecting the ESA balance in 2007
(as a percentage of GDP)
* Negative numbers denote deterioration in the balance (rise in the deficit), relative to 2006.
The external borrowing requirement as the sum of
the current account balance and the capital
account balance was EUR 1.54 billion in 2005 Q2,
with the deficit on current account balance
amounting to EUR 1.7 billion. Following a continu-
ous fall since 2004 Q2, brought about mainly by a
slow expansion in goods imports, the seasonally
adjusted external borrowing requirement calculat-
ed in this manner, i.e. ‘from above’, fell to 6.6 per
cent of GDP. As noted in the August Report, the
spectacular fall in the external borrowing require-
ment calculated ‘from above’ is still not in harmo-
ny with developments in the borrowing require-
ment of both the general government and house-
holds and real economic trends.
Thanks to changes in the methodology applied to
the balance of payments statistics, uncertainties
over external equilibrium processes became
explicit. Under the former methodology, the bal-
ance of payments statistics accounted for differ-
ences in data on trade in goods from corporate
data provision and cash flow reports as trade
receivables or liabilities. The differences between
the two statistics are, in principle, attributable to
those in methodology (corporate reports use the
accrual method of accounting, while their bank
counterparts are cash flow-based), i.e. the lag
between the time of the delivery of goods and the
date of payment. Thus, economically, it is safe to
assume that the scale of the difference cannot be
independent of the volume of trade in goods.
However, since Hungary’s accession to the EU the
difference between the statistics has reached a
level that is no longer justifiable by methodological
differences. The data for the trade deficit published
by the CSO lagged significantly behind the amount
that is in line with the financial balance. As a result,
corporate trade receivables grew in a manner that
cannot be justified economically. The above bias is
eliminated by a change in methodology where any
difference between the two statistics that is beyond
what is justifiable methodologically has been
recorded in the “errors and omissions“ row of the
balance sheet since 2004 Q2.
Revision, i.e. the explicit disclosure of differences
in statistics, allows for the possibility that the exter-
nal borrowing requirement ‘from below’, arising
from the financial balance, can be quantified. In
contrast to a steady decline in the external bor-
rowing requirement as the sum of the current
account balance and the capital account balance,
the seasonally adjusted external borrowing
requirement ‘from below’ was 8 to 10 per cent of
GDP in the last year. The seasonally adjusted
external borrowing requirement calculated ‘from
below’ and corrected for imports brought forward
due to Hungary’s EU accession and the bias of
4. 3 Developments in external balance
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Net financing capacity of corporations (”from above”)
Net financing capacity of corporations (”from below”)
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Corporate and external lending capacity
(as a proportion of GDP)*
*Differences ascribable to imports brought forward because of Hungary's
EU accession and data adjusted by the impact of the phasing out of customs
warehousing as a result of the EU accession resulting in a rise in imports.
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data on imports caused by the phasing out of
warehousing remained 9 to 9.5 per cent as a pro-
portion of GDP in 2005 Q2, a level practically
unchanged since 2004 Q4.
The GDP-proportionate external borrowing require-
ment remained unchanged against a backdrop of a
moderate rise in the general government borrowing
requirement. Following a sharp rise in the borrowing
requirement in 2005 Q1, no moderation materi-
alised in Q2, with the borrowing requirement
exceeding 11 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile,
increase in households’ net financial savings,
decelerating since 2003 Q2, came to a halt.
Simultaneously, corporate borrowing requirement –
consistent with the external borrowing requirement
calculated ‘from below’ – declined somewhat.
Under our projection the GDP-proportionate gen-
eral government borrowing requirement may
increase substantially, amounting to 9.5 per cent
of GDP in 2005. The same may hold true for the
increase in the household sector’s net savings.
Based on what was experienced in H1, the annu-
alised corporate borrowing requirement, calculat-
ed ‘from below’, may also be somewhat lower.
External borrowing requirement, calculated from
‘from above’, may fall to 7.4 per cent of GDP.
However, the external borrowing requirement, cal-
culated from ‘from below’ and consistent with debt
figures, is unlikely to fall below 9 per cent of GDP.
In 2006, due to an anticipated marked rise in
general government borrowing requirement and
one-sided risks implied in external equilibrium
trends, GDP-proportionate external borrowing
requirement is expected to rise by 1 percentage
point. General government borrowing require-
ment may reach 10.3 per cent of GDP, while
households’ GDP-proportionate net financial sav-
ings is only likely to increase moderately. Due to
Table 4-8
GDP-proportionate current account balance and the financial position of the individual sectors
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimates Projections
I. Consolidated general government* -8.9 -8.6 -8.3 -9.5 -10.3
II. Private sector (=1+2) 2.3 0.0 -1.7 0.4 1.2
1. Households 2.7 0.2 2.0 3.0 3.2
2. Corporations -0.4 -0.1 -3.7 -2.6 -2.0
External financing capacity ”from below” (= I+II = -B+C) -6.6 -8.5 -10.0 -9.2 -9.2
External financing capacity ”from above” (=A+C) -6.9 -8.8 -8.5 -7.4** -8.4**
A. Current account balance -7.2 -8.8 -8.8 -8.1** -9.1**
– in EUR billions -5.0 -6.4 -7.1 -7.0** -8.3**
B. Financial account balance 6.9 8.5 10.3 9.8 9.9
C. Capital account balance 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.8
* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, ÁPV Rt., institutions attending to quasi-fiscal duties
(e.g. Hungarian Railways and Budapest Transport Company), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the
government and formally implemented under PPP schemes.
** Uncertainties over calculations related to trade statistics point to higher current account deficit and external borrowing requirement.
methodological risks implied in the trade deficit,
we expect that in 2006 the accrual-basis trade
deficit will approximate to cash flow trade deficit,
the latter being more in line with financing trends.
This may also increase the external borrowing
requirement.
In respect of the structure of the current account
balance, the real economic deficit in 2005, as a
result of the trend-like decline experienced over
the past one year, may decrease significantly, to
an extent unjustified by real and financing trends.
As a result of a rapid rise in the net external debt
and the significant amounts of dividend paid, the
deficit of the balance of income to GDP may slight-
ly increase. Overall, the ratio of the current account
deficit to GDP may fall 0.7 per cent short of the cor-
responding figure recorded in 2004. It is expected
that in the course of 2006-2007 the uncertainty sur-
rounding trade statistics will gradually decline, and
2006 the accrual-based trade deficit will approach
the level indicated by cash-flow data, more consis-
tent with the economic developments, while the
one-off deficit-increasing effect of the Gripen lease
also appears in the balance. In 2007, however,
slowing consumption and capital formation may
again reduce deficit in the balance of the real
economy. The current account deficit may be
around EUR 8.2-8.3 billion in 2006–2007.
Financing the current account deficit
In 2005 Q2, the significance of non-debt generat-
ing financing further decreased within deficit
financing. Less than 20 per cent of the external
financing requirement was financed from the
inflow of net non-debt generating funds, and the
remaining amount increased net external debt.
Although the amount of non-debt generating cap-
ital flowing to Hungary increased in comparison to
the previous quarter, the outflow of capital also
rose. The primary underlying reason for this
increase in the outflow of non-debt generating
capital is Hungarian companies’ expansion in the
region. The substantial amount of shares sold by
non-residents also contributed to the drop in non-
debt generating financing. 
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Table 4-9
Current account balance to GDP*
(as a proportion of GDP, in per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Fact Forecast
1. Goods and services balance -1.5 -2.4 -4.5 -3.1 -2.0** -3.2** -2.7
2.  Income balance -5.5 -5.6 -5.1 -6.1 -6.4 -6.3 -6.3
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
I. Current account balance (1+2+3) -6.2 -7.2 -8.8 -8.8 -8.1** -9.1** -8.5
Current account balance in EUR billions -3.6 -5.0 -6.4 -7.1 -7.0** -8.3** -8.3
II. Capital account balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8
External financing capacity (I+II) -5.6 -6.9 -8.8 -8.5 -7.4** -8.4** -7.7
* The forecast for 2006 and 2007 includes imports arising from the recognition of the lease fee paid by the Hungarian Army for Gripen fighter planes and
amounting to approximately 0.5 per cent of GDP.
** Uncertainties over calculations related to trade statistics point to higher current account deficit and external borrowing requirement.
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As regards debt-generating financing, following
significant purchases of government securities
and HUF deposits in the first quarter, non-resi-
dents reduced their stocks held in government
securities and HUF deposits by altogether EUR
235 million in 2005 Q2. As a result of a method-
ological revision, the corporate sector’s net bor-
rowing from the rest of the world changed with ret-
rospective effect. In addition to a slower increase
in the corporate sectors’ trade loan receivables of
the corporate sector against the rest of the world,
their net liabilities to the rest of the world have
become broadly flat after a period of marked
decrease. In 2005 Q2, banks collected a substan-
tial amount of funds in foreign exchange, in
excess of EUR 1 billion, used primarily for financ-
ing foreign exchange-based home loans to house-
holds. Following a temporary slowdown in 2005
Q1, households’ HUF exchange rate exposure has
increased by roughly EUR 1 billion.
Table 4-10
External financing requirement 
(EUR millions)
2004 2004 2005
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
1. External borrowing requirement (=1.1+1.2) -1378 -2247 -1589 -1662 -6876 -1374 -1536
1.1 Current account balance -1324 -2249 -1766 -1797 -7136 -1545 -1701
1.2 Capital account balance –54 2 177 135 260 171 165
2. Financing 1245 2649 1552 2954 8400 2963 2276
2.1  Direct capital investment 445 465 1282 659 2852 663 602
2.1.1 Direct capital investment abroad -353 -229 -57 -217 -856 -412 -741
2.1.2 Direct capital investment in Hungary 798 694 1339 876 3708 1074 1344
2.2 General government loan transactions 904 74 1353 1468 3799 2051 751
2.2.1 MNB loan transactions -738 -25 -61 -26 -848 -475 37
2.2.2 Government loan transactions 861 690 450 1579 3579 2051 908
(excluding government securities)
2.2.3. Non-residents' government 781 -592 964 -85 1068 475 -194
securities purchases
2.3 Net capital funding of the private sector 34 2018 -378 1240 2915 685 1214
2.3.1 Credit institutions' liabilities 306 1934 106 1029 3375 864 1287
2.3.2 Portfolio investments 322 98 99 314 833 -175 -308
(equity securities)
2.3.3 Corporations' net foreign borrowing -594 -14 -582 -103 -1293 -5 235
2.4 Balance of errors and omissions -138 92 -706 -413 –1166 -436 -341
3. Changes in international reserves (1+2) -133 402 -32 1292 1528 1589 689
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